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BANKRUPTCY AS A REVOLUTIONARY CONCEPT:
GOOD FAITH FILING AND A THEORY OF
OBLIGATION
Linda J. Rusch"
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is a revolutionary concept. Obligations created
and enforced according to other legal doctrines are excused and
altered. Congress has enacted a bankruptcy statute1 that places
very few explicit barriers to a debtor's access to this obligation
altering procedure.2 The courts have responded to the open
availability of bankruptcy by erecting a barrier to relief that
requires the petition to be filed in good faith.3 Commentators
have discussed whether such a barrier should exist4 and how
* Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; J.D. 1983,
University of Iowa College of Law. I am grateful for the comments of Pat Bauer, Ed
Butterfoss, Marie Failinger, Robin Magee, David Moss, Ken Salzberg and Howard
Vogel on earlier drafts. Thank you to all members of the Hamline University School
of Law faculty who commented on these ideas at a faculty colloquium.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the good faith requirement in Chapter 7, see 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY T 707.03, at 707-10 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1995); In re
Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994); Zick v. Industrial Ins. Servs. (In re
Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1126-28 (6th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the good faith re-
quirement in Chapter 11, see 5 COLLIER, SUPRA, T 1112.03, at 1112.32 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1995); Trident Assoc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re Trident
Assoc.), 52 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1995); In re Marsch, 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir.
1994); Elmwood Dev. Co. v. General Elec. (In re Elmwood Dev. Co.), 964 F.2d 508,
510 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Kerr, 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1990); Carolin Corp. v.
Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 1989); In Re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d
1393, 1394 (lth Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the good faith requirement in Chap-
ter 12, see Euerle Farms, Inc. v. State Bank (In re Euerle Farms, Inc.), 861 F.2d
1089, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Roth, 167 B.R. 911, 913-15 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1994);
Schuldies v. United States (In re Schuldies), 122 B.R. 100, 102-03 (D.S.D. 1990); In
re Beswick, 98 B.R. 900, 902-03 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). For a discussion of the good
faith requirement in Chapter 13, see Eisen v. Curry (In re Eisen), 14 F.3d 469, 470
(9th Cir. 1994) (per curium); Gier v. Farmers State Bank (In re Gier), 986 F.2d
1326, 1329-30 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (7th Cir. 1992).
To be confirmed, a reorganization plan must be filed in good faith. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1129(a)(3), 1225(a)(3), 1325(a)(3) (1994). In each of the reorganization cases under
Chapters 11, 12, or 13 listed above, the court implied a good faith filing requirement
in addition to the good faith confirmation requirement. Good faith at plan confirma-
tion focuses on the terms of the plan and the debtor's conduct during the case
whereas the good faith filing requirement is directed at the debtor's conduct pre-
petition or in the early stages of the case. See 5 COLLIER, supra, 1129.02[31[a][ii],
at 1129-32 to 1129-34.
4. Janet A- Flaccus, Have Eight Circuits Shorted? Good Faith and Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Petitions, 67 AM. BANKR. J. 401 (1993); Daniel J. Tyukody, Jr., Note,
Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bankruptcy Code: Treating the Symptom, Not the
1
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good faith should be defined.5 This article attempts to explain
why the courts might feel compelled to erect a barrier to relief in
addition to the explicit statutory requirements that Congress put
in place.
The courts' compulsion to erect a barrier to bankruptcy use
is puzzling if law is viewed as a tool to further a client's inter-
ests. A careful lawyer would look at the advantages and disad-
vantages of filing a bankruptcy petition to address the problems
at hand and advise the client accordingly. In most areas of com-
Cause, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 795 (1985). See also Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions
and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 519 (1992) (analysis of the allowance
of voluntary filings). Based on the legislative history, Flaccus demonstrates that good
faith filing was explicitly deleted from the proposed bankruptcy bills and argues that
such deletion evidences legislative intent to not impose a good faith filing require-
ment. Flaccus, supra, at 410-14.
5. See, e.g., Good Faith: A Roundtable Discussion, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
11 (1993); Deborah A. Ballam, The "Good Faith" Requirement for Confirmation of a
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Proceeding, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 603 (1988); Richard S. Bell, The
Effect of the Disposable Income Test of Section 1325(b)(1)(B) Upon the Good Faith
Inquiry of Section 1325(a)(3), 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 267 (1988); H. Miles Cohn, Good
Faith and the Single-Asset Debtor, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131 (1988); Daniel G.
Chadwick, Note, In re Prine: Good Faith, Dischargeability and Conversion from Chap-
ter 7 to a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 19 IDAHO L. REv. 115 (1983); Carlos J. Cuevas,
Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard That Should be Employed to Dismiss Bad
Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 TENN. L. REv. 525 (1993); Conrad K. Cyr, The Chapter
13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J.
271 (1981); Karen Declercq, Note, Johnson v. Home State Bank: Use or Abuse of
Chapter 13?, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 823 (1992); Eugene J. Di Donato, Good Faith Reor-
ganization Petitions: The Back Door Lets the Stranger In, 16 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Clifford P. Harbour, Comment, Good Faith in Chapter 13: A New Wild Card for
Bankruptcy, 8 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 102 (1981); Ellen M. Horn, Note, Good Faith and
Chapter 13 Discharge: How Much Discretion is Too Much?, 11 CARDOzO L. REv. 657
(1990); Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Require-
ment: Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the
Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77 (1992); John T. Kelly, Note, "Good Faith" Anal-
ysis under Chapter 13-The Totality of Circumstances Approach: Handeen v. LaMaire,
23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 573 (1990); Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and
Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflections on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOwA L. REV.
199 (1985); Elisabeth S. Ladd, Note, In re Okareeh-Baah, The Status of Good Faith
under Chapter 13, 20 U. TOL. L. REv. 699 (1989); John A. Majors, In re Zick: Chap-
ter 7's Good Faith Threshold Standard, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 583 (1992); Michael L.
Molinaro, Single-Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies: Curbing an Abuse of the Bankruptcy
Process, 24 UCC L.J. 161 (1991); Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse,
50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (Spring 1987); Robert L. Ordin, The Good Faith
Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAw. 1795 (1983); Lawrence
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement:
Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919 (1991); Mark E.
Roszkowski, Good Faith and Chapter 13 Plans Providing for Debts Nondischargeable
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Assess Rehabilitation, Not
Liquidation, 46 BUS. LAW. 67 (1990); Michael J. Venditto, The Implied Requirement
of "Good Faith" Filing: Where are the Limits of Bad Faith, 1993 DET. C.L. REV.
1591.
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mercial law and practice, however, the statute is neither the
starting nor the ending point in determining acceptable conduct
in the particular situation. In addition to the statutes and com-
mon law doctrines, parties to transactions and their lawyers look
to standards of commercial dealing and fairness in attempting to
define acceptable conduct in any given transaction. For example,
in the Uniform Commercial Code, a major source of non-bank-
ruptcy commercial law, the foundational concept is the legitima-
tion of reasonable conduct as determined by nonstatutory stan-
dards of moral conduct.6 Those nonstatutory standards of con-
duct are in turn based upon unwritten value and belief systems
regarding acceptable commercial practices.7
Similarly, the relationship that exists between debtors and
creditors is both bounded and defined by a mixture of legal rules
and human expectations regarding how the parties should be-
have toward each other and third parties. When a party files
bankruptcy, the legal rules governing permissible behavior
change. Although the legal rules may change, human expecta-
tions regarding permissible behavior do not magically change
when one party files a bankruptcy petition. Rather, the changes
in legal rules that run against previously existing expectations
cause divisiveness, conflict and charges of abuse.
One usual behavioral expectation between debtors and credi-
tors is linked to the idea of obligation. A debtor is said to owe an
obligation to a creditor and a creditor may owe an obligation to a
debtor.' The concepts of owing and obligation imply that the
party owing the obligation will and should fulfill that obliga-
tion. The bankruptcy process allows alteration of previously
6. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) (every contract or duty within the Act imposes an
obligation of good faith); U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1994) (good faith for a merchant means
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade"); U.C.C. §§ 2-706, 9-504 (1994) (sales must be commercially
reasonable); Christina L. Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach
with the UCC, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1105 (1990); Richard E. Speidel, Article 2
and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 Loy. L.A L. REV. 789 (1993). See also Symposium
on the Law of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1994);
Robert S. Alder & Richard A. Mann, Good Faith: A New Look at an Old Doctrine,
28 AKRON L. REV. 31 (1994); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 5, at 970-71 &
n.168-69 (discussing good faith literature).
7. See William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545
(linking behavioral expectations to norm of productivity).
8. The idea of a creditor having an obligation to a debtor can be seen clearly
in the area called lender liability. For a description of many of the theories of lender
liability, see Bruce E.H. Johnson, Lender Liability Litigation Checklist: A Summary of
Current Theories and Developments, 59 UMKC L. REV. 205 (1991).
9. J.C. SMITH, LEGAL OBLIGATION 37-38 (1976).
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existing obligations. 0
The good faith filing requirement which the courts impose as
a barrier to that obligation altering procedure raises the follow-
ing basic question: What values and beliefs shape the imposition
of an obligation and what values and beliefs justify altering an
obligation? By explicitly identifying those values and beliefs that
appear to support the concept of obligation and how current
bankruptcy law may run counter to those values and beliefs, one
can demonstrate the genesis of charges that a debtor lacks good
faith, or is substantially abusing the bankruptcy process. Lack of
good faith or substantial abuse are code words for describing
human behavior that runs counter to normative behavioral ex-
pectations founded on deeply held, but not much discussed, val-
ues and beliefs.1" Expectations about "proper" human behavior
10. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43
STANFORD L. REV. 99 (1990). The link between bankruptcy law and the concept of
obligation can be clearly drawn if bankruptcy is conceptualized on a very simple
level. First, bankruptcy lets the debtor entity discharge the personal obligation to pay
a debt. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1228, 1328 (1994); see Douglas G. Boshkoff, Fresh
Start, False Start or Head Start?, 70 IND. L.J. 549 (1995); Richard E. Flint, Bank-
ruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the Con-
sumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (1991); Charles J. Tabb, The Historical
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991). Second,
bankruptcy requires those with in rem interests in the debtor's property to wait to
enforce those interests against the property, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) (automatic stay),
to run the risk that the in rem interest will be avoided in whole or part, 11 U.S.C.
§ 544 (1994) (lien avoidance if lien unperfected), 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (avoiding
preferences), and to run the risk that the in rem obligations might be modified in
significant ways without the claimant's consent. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b), 1225(a)(5),
1325(a)(5) (1994). Third, bankruptcy reorganization allows debtors to stay in control
of their property during the process and to make the decisions regarding how the
personal and in rem obligations will be altered in the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1994)
(rights, powers and duties of the debtor in possession); 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994) (ex-
clusive ability of debtor to file a plan for 120 days after order for relief); 11 U.S.C. §
1221 (1994) (debtor to file plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994) (debtor to file plan). The
debtor's ability to alter claims on a non-consensual basis is limited in some respects
by the confirmation requirements found in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b), 1225, 1325 (1994).
See Linda J. Rusch, Gerrymandering the Classification Issue in Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zations, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 163, 167-80 (1992); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down 11, 64
AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990); Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About
Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
Fourth, some of the obligations that a creditor may have owed to a debtor may not
be enforceable. A notable alteration of a creditor's obligation to the debtor is found in
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1994) which excuses the creditor from honoring a pre-petition
contract to make a loan or other financial accommodation to the debtor.
11. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an Irresolute Endorsement for
Scientific Rationalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, 1993 WIs. L. REV.
1439, 1443-49 (drawing connection between principles of morality and bankruptcy
preferences); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611, 624-28 (1988) (values and beliefs have always been part of legal discourse even
4
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in the area of obligation center around values and beliefs regard-
ing individual autonomy, proper restraints on autonomy, human
rationality, and the possibility of human progress.12 The courts
appear to use the good faith filing requirement as a tool for de-
termining whether the bankruptcy filing is acceptable debtor
conduct based upon those nonstatutory values and beliefs.
Placing the good faith filing requirement in the context of
values and beliefs regarding obligation is helpful in at least two
ways. First, placing the good faith filing requirement in the con-
text of values and beliefs about obligation may help the courts be
more thoughtful in their analysis of good faith.13 If courts iden-
tify why the good faith filing requirement is taking place, that
knowledge might help to shape the inquiry as well as prompt
consideration of whether the inquiry should take place at all. For
if not explicitly recognized as such); Linda J. Rusch, Bankruptcy Reorganization Ju-
risprudence: Matters of Belief, Faith, and Hope-Stepping into the Fourth Dimension,
55 MONT. L. REv. 9 (1994) (differing values and beliefs are at stake in the bankrupt-
cy theorists' arguments about the vision of bankruptcy).
12. See infra notes 171-224 and accompanying text. This article does not advo-
cate that the values and beliefs that provide the foundation for obligation are neces-
sarily morally right or morally required. Nor does this inquiry take the position that
such identified values and beliefs are the only relevant considerations that should be
on the table for discussion. Finally, this inquiry does not mean that once this ex-
ercise is over, we will have a blueprint for constructing a bankruptcy law that will
eliminate the charge that a bankruptcy filing is "abusive." In other words, this inqui-
ry is not a reductionist inquiry based on limited guiding principles that can be ap-
plied cleanly and quickly to come to a determinative result. Normative expectations
about "proper" human behavior are much too contextual, open-ended and fluid for
such a reductionist approach. See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought,
91 COL. L. REv. 68 (1991).
13. This article acknowledges that arguments about legal rules are based in
part upon unarticulated and hidden values and beliefs. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 115-17 (1985) (beliefs, morals and ideals must be
taken into account in law); LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAw 8-13 (4th ed. 1994) (re-
lationship between legal reasoning and values). By acknowledging the first premise
above and openly talking about values and beliefs, we are not doomed to radical
indeterminacy and the death of the concept of the rule of law. Rather, openness to
that discussion can lead to a more robust and honest debate about our normative
expectations for "proper" human behavior. See JOHN A. EISENBERG, THE LIMITS OF
REASON: INDETERMINACY IN LAW, EDUCATION, AND MORALITY (1992) (indeterminacy is
inevitable); Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal
Interpretation, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541 (1989) (arguing that indeterminacy is inher-
ent in law and not fatal to democratic values); Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Dis-
agreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997
(1994) (explaining that indeterminacy not fatal to rule of law concept); Francis J.
Mootz, III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious is Plausi-
ble, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69 (1993) (explaining that indeterminacy not fatal to rule of
law concept); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of
Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 991 (1994) (analyzing relationship between rule of law
concept and indeterminacy).
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example, how can it be bad faith to file for the purpose of alter-
ing one particular obligation when the entire structure of the
bankruptcy statute allows a debtor to file in order to alter obliga-
tions? Second, evaluating bankruptcy as a scheme for altering
obligations may help Congress, when it considers bankruptcy
reform, 5 to gain perspective on how bankruptcy might better
accord with those values and beliefs so as to minimize the charge
that filing bankruptcy is abusive behavior. 6
Part II explains both the statutory requirements of a bank-
ruptcy filing and the courts' good faith analysis. In Part III, the
dominant theories in contract, tort, and property are examined to
identify the arguments made to justify imposing obligations. Part
IV then identifies four major values and beliefs that are common
to the justification arguments examined in Part III and uses
those four major values and beliefs to synthesize a theory of
obligation. In Part V, this theory of obligation is used to shed
light on the courts' imposition of a good faith filing barrier to
bankruptcy relief.
II. THE GOOD FAITH FILING REQUIREMENT
A debtor can file a voluntary petition under any one of four
chapters17 of the Bankruptcy Code."5 Chapter 7 is designed as
a liquidation process 9 and Chapter 11 is designed as a reorga-
nization process. ° Chapters 12 and 13 are also reorganization
processes designed for particular types of debtors."
14. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
15. Congress has established a Bankruptcy Review Commission to evaluate the
bankruptcy statute and make proposals for reform. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4147.
16. If values and beliefs are identified that cut across major legal categories, it
seems that structuring a bankruptcy law to cohere with those values and beliefs
might be possible. Although coherence with existing values and beliefs does not in
and of itself justify a law, such coherence might be a necessary first step in justifica-
tion in a non-positivist sense. See Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in
Legal Thought, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 153, 155 (1990) (arguing that when all modes
of analysis converge, then we have more confidence in the correctness of the result).
17. A fifth chapter, Chapter 9, allows municipalities to file for reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994). Because a Chapter 9 filing involves a government entity,
the considerations involved in determining whether a filing is allowable are suffi-
ciently distinct from the thesis of this article to exclude Chapter 9 from further con-
sideration. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
19. 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, ] 700.01.
20. 5 COLLIER, supra note 3, 1100.01.
21. 5 COLLIER, supra note 3, 1200.01, 1300.02.
6
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To file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, the debtor must
fulfill very few requirements. For all petitions, a debtor must
reside, be domiciled, have a place of business, or have property
in the United States.22 Congress did not require that debtors
who file voluntary petitions meet any financial insolvency
tests."
Each chapter has some minimal restriction on who can be a
debtor under that particular chapter. To file a Chapter 7 peti-
tion, the debtor must not be a railroad, an insurance company, or
a lending institution.24 To file a Chapter 11 petition, the debtor
must meet the Chapter 7 criteria, except that a railroad may file
a Chapter 11 petition but stock and commodity brokers may
not.25 A family farmer with regular income is the only entity
allowed to file a Chapter 12 petition.26 An individual with regu-
lar income27 and noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts
less than $250,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts
less than $750,000 may file a Chapter 13 petition."
Each chapter also has a provision that allows the court to
dismiss the fied petition. Chapter 7 petitions can be dismissed
either "for cause" or if the court finds in the case of an individual
debtor that owes primarily consumer debts that relief under
Chapter 7 would be substantial abuse of the provisions.29 In
22. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
23. An involuntary petition will result in an order for relief against that debtor
under 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) only if:
(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts
become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or
(2) within 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a custodian,
other than a trustee, receiver or agent appointed or authorized to take
charge of less than substantially all of the property of the debtor for the
purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, was appointed or took
possession.
11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)-(2) (1994). The Code defines insolvency as "the sum of such
entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)
(1994). Contrast the lack of an insolvency test under other chapters with Chapter 9
municipality reorganization petitions where the municipality must be insolvent. 11
U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (1994).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1994).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1994).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (1994). The terms within the phrase "family farmer with
regular income" are defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)-(21) (1994).
27. "An individual with regular income" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)
(1994).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1994). In Chapter 7 consumer cases, the court has the ex-
plicit authority to dismiss the petition for substantial abuse under § 707(b). See Da-
vid L. Balser, Note, Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: A Roadmap with a Pro-
posed Standard for Defining Substantial Abuse, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1011 (1986);
7
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Chapters 11, 12 and 13, a petition can be dismissed "for
cause."" Courts have used the open ended concept of "cause" to
require that the petition be filed in good faith.
The courts have struggled with how to define good faith. 1
The key inquiry seems to be whether the debtor is abusing the
Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dis-
missal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse", 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (first installment)
(1985); Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7
Dismissal on the Basis of "Substantial Abuse", 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 33 (second install-
ment) (1986); Michael D. Bruckman, Note, The Thickening Fog of "Substantial
Abuse" : Can 707(a) Help Clear the Air?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 193 (1994);
Karen Gross, The Debtor as a Modern Day Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990); Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start
for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit
Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (1986); Robert M. Thompson, Comment, Consum-
er Bankruptcy: Substantial Abuse and Section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code, 55 MO. L.
REV. 247 (1990). But see Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook,
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts,
1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (1994) (data suggests consumers not substantially
abusing bankruptcy provisions).
30. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b), 1208(c), 1307(c) (1994). In each of these chapters,
cause includes but is not limited to the inability to reorganize.
31. Determining whether to dismiss a petition for bad faith "requires a difficult
distinction between permissible and impermissible motives. Debtors often wish to
shelter whatever assets they can from their creditors and the Bankruptcy Code per-
mits them to do so." First Nat'l Bank v. Kerr (In re Kerr), 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th
Cir. 1990). As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in In re James Wilson
Assocs., 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992):
What should count as bad faith in this setting is unclear. It is not bad
faith to seek to gain an advantage from declaring bankruptcy-why else
would one declare it? One might have supposed that the clearest case of
bad faith would be filing for bankruptcy knowing that one was not bank-
rupt, but the Bankruptcy Code permits an individual or firm that has debts
to declare bankruptcy even though he (or it) is not insolvent.... The
clearest case of bad faith is where the debtor enters Chapter 11 knowing
that there is no chance to reorganize his business and hoping merely to
stave off the evil day when the creditors take control of his property.
Id. at 170.
As categorized by one commentator examining Chapter 11 cases, the courts
generally use one of three tests. See Cuevas, supra note 5. Some courts use an objec-
tive and subjective test. Id. at 529-31. The objective component is that the debtor
had no reasonable prospect of reorganizing. The subjective component is filing with
the intent to harm creditors or abuse the integrity of the bankruptcy system. Id. at
529. Some courts use only the subjective test and hold that a petition is filed in bad
faith if the debtor filed the case with the intent to harm creditors or misuse the
Chapter 11 process. Id. at 529, 532-34. Finally, some courts use a totality of the
circumstances test. Under this test, the courts examine all of the facts and circum-
stances of the case to determine whether the debtor is abusing the process or the
filing undermines the integrity of the system. Id. at 535. Courts using this approach
develop lists of the factors that are badges of bad faith and compare the facts in the
case to that list of factors. If enough factors are present, then the case is filed in
bad faith- Id- at 536-37
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process.32 Many commentators have sought to identify fact pat-
terns which typify an abuse of the bankruptcy process."3 The
inquiry here, however, is to explain why the courts feel com-
pelled to scrutinize the debtor's behavior to determine whether
the debtor is abusing the process. By seeking an explanation for
that compulsion in obligation theory, the issues of whether a
good faith filing requirement should exist and the appropriate
analysis for such a requirement can be more fully understood.
III. OBLIGATION IN LEGAL THEORY
Obligation is the label we attach to the conclusion that
something "ought" to happen.34 In constructing a theory of obli-
gation in law, the first step is to offer reasons why that some-
32. Ordin, supra note 5, at 1796. The following quotes are representative sam-
ples of language the courts use. In a Chapter 7 case, the court in Industrial Ins.
Servs. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991) quoted McLaughlin v.
Jones (In re Jones), 114 B.R. 917 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) for the following:
The Bankruptcy Code is intended to serve those persons, who, despite their
best efforts, find themselves hopelessly adrift in a sea of debt. Bankruptcy
protection was not intended to assist those who, despite their own miscon-
duct, are attempting to preserve a comfortable standard of living at the
expense of their creditors.
114 B.R. at 926. In a Chapter 11 case, the court in Elmwood Dev. Co. v. General
Elec. (In re Elmwood Dev. Co.), 964 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1992) stated: "The good
faith standard protects the integrity of the bankruptcy courts and prohibits a debtor's
misuse of the process where the overriding motive is to delay creditors without any
possible benefit, or to achieve a reprehensible purpose through manipulation of the
bankruptcy laws." In a Chapter 12 case, the court in Euerle Farms, Inc. v. State
Bank (In re Euerle Farms, Inc.), 861 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1988) stated: "The
filing of a bankruptcy petition without the intent or ability to properly reorganize is
an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code and renders the petition subject to dismissal" (cit-
ing In re Turner, 71 B.R. 120, 123 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987)). In a Chapter 13 case,
the court in In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992) stated: "[T]he focus of the
good faith inquiry under both Section 1307 and Section 1325 is often whether the
filing is fundamentally fair to creditors and, more generally, is the filing fundamen-
tally fair in a manner that complies with the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code's provi-
sions." Id. at 1357.
33. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Professors Ponoroff and
Knippenberg recognized this fact in their seminal article on good faith filing as a
sentinel of bankruptcy policy. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 5, at 947. They
discussed in depth how the courts should determine whether the debtor's conduct is
acceptable in a Chapter 11 filing. Id. at 970-91. They posit that the case is initially
identified as suspect if it does not deal with multiple defaults and limited assets. Id.
at 975. The courts should then closely scrutinize the case based upon two consider-
ations: intent and impact. Intent takes into account the sum of the motives that
prompted the filing. Impact takes into account the effect on the community and
whether the adversities that prompted the filing could be addressed adequately in
another forum. Id. at 976-77.
34. SMITH, supra note 9, at 65.
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thing, whatever it is, ought to happen.35 Those reasons become
part of the justification of the obligation. Those reasons are, in
turn, based upon various values and beliefs.36
A person incurs a debtor or creditor obligation that the legal
system enforces in areas artificially divided into contracts, torts,
and property.37 Each area of legal rules so divided comes com-
plete with theorists who attempt to explain why contract, tort
and property legal rules should create legally enforceable obliga-
tions.
These justification theories are constructed on two levels.
The first level asks what principles justify enforcing these types
of obligations in general. For example, contract theory at the
general level is concerned with the question of whether a prom-
ise or conduct of one party should result in a contractual obliga-
tion of that party to another.38 Tort theory at the general level
is concerned with whether any obligation is justified when a
person is harmed when two or more persons interact.39 Property
law' at the general level is concerned with whether one party
35. Id. at 47-48. For an interesting discussion on the role of giving reasons in
law, see Frederick Shauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
36. SMITH, supra note 9, at 40.
37. A legally enforceable duty is only one type of obligation. Michael I. Swygert,
The Moral Basis of Obligation: A Critique of 'Obligation-Duty' Contemporary Analysis,
16 STETSON L. REV. 557, 558 (1987). Bankruptcy, however, is about altering legally
enforceable obligations and thus this analysis focuses on legal obligation.
38. See infra notes 46-74 and accompanying text. See generally Randy E.
Barnett,.... And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 421, 424
(1993) (discussing the philosphical concern about justification of contract enforcement
as morally just); JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 41-45, 71-79, 114-21, 135-46, 162-75, 223-41 (1991) (discussing philosophies
of contract in various historical periods).
39. See infra notes 75-103 and accompanying text.
40. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY § 2.1, at 16-17 (1990); C.
Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 741, 742-43 (1986); Alex Kozinski, Introduction: of Profligacy, Piracy, and
Private Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 19 (1990). Some artificiality exists
in dividing the concept of obligation into obligation in contract theory and obligation
in property theory. The dividing line between what is considered a property right
and what is considered a contract right is not all that bright and not very defensi-
ble. See James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganiza-
tion: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy
Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 988-95 (1983); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). As Joseph Singer stated:
Property and contract rights are not self-defining. In allocating them, we
must often choose between competing principles: between title and posses-
sion, between contract and reliance, between freedom and security, between
voluntariness and duress. There is simply no way to derive logically the
inherent meaning either of contract or of property because each contains
10
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is under an obligation to accede to the will of another regarding
allocation or use of resources.4
At the specific level, justification theory focuses on whether
an obligation should be recognized in the context of a particular
fact situation. For example, in contract theory, justifications at
the specific level center on the question of whether a contractual
within it an accommodation between the contradictory claims of freedom
and security. Every entitlement implies a correlative vulnerability of others.
This is the Hohfeldian lesson: for every benefit there is a cost; for every
entitlement, there is a correlative exposure. . . . Because all legal rights
protect some interests at the expense of other competing interests, we must
choose whom to protect and whom to leave vulnerable. Property and con-
tract rights do not define themselves for us. We cannot define them without
reference to controversial political and moral commitments.
Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 647-48
(1988) (advocating, defining and protecting rights as property based upon relation-
ships and reliance); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nine-
teenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
325 (1980) (describing the concept of property as changing from things to any ex-
change of value); Wayne McCormack, Property and Liberty-Institutional Competence
and the Functions of Rights, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1994) (analyzing similarities
between function of protecting property and liberty interests).
41. See infra notes 104-37 and accompanying text. Conflicting claims to resourc-
es come about because resources are scarce. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 31-32 (1988); Carol M. Rose, Property Right, Regulatory Regimes and
the New Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577,
584-85 (1990). Resolving claims about resources requires some system of allocation of
those resources. WALDRON, supra, at 32. Property regimes are the systems used to
resolve disputes about resource allocation. Id. Viewing property law at that level of
abstraction allows the relationship between the concept of property and the concept
of obligation to become apparent. Property regimes give authority to claims that
people "ought" to accede to the will of one person or entity regarding the allocation
of that resource. Baker, supra note 40, at 742-43. Whenever the concept of "ought" is
used, the issue is one of obligation. SMITH, supra note 9, at 26.
Jeremy Waldron has described three types of property regimes: private prop-
erty, collective property, and common property. Private property regimes are "orga-
nized around the idea that resources are on the whole separate objects each assigned
and therefore belonging to some particular individual." WALDRON, supra, at 38. That
particular individual has the right to "determine how the object shall be used and by
whom." Id. at 39. Collective property regimes allocate property with "a social rule
that the use of material resources in particular cases is to be determined by refer-
ence to the collective interests of society as a whole." Id. at 40. These regimes allo-
cate use based upon the use most conducive to collective social interest. Id. Common
property regimes allocate property based on the principle that "each resource is in
principle available for the use of every member alike" and utilize some procedure for
determining how to allocate property for use by particular individuals on particular
occasions. Id. at 41. In each of these different types of property regimes, individuals
who want to use resources will have to accede to the will of the deciding entity re-
garding the resource. The primary property regime in the United States is the pri-
vate property regime. Id. at 16-18. The remaining discussion will be concerned with
the justification for a private property regime.
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obligation should be recognized in a particular fact situation.42
In torts, the theorists debate about what type of obligation
should be created in different fact situations, for example, negli-
gence based obligations or strict liability based obligations.' In
property, the debate is about what justifies a particular alloca-
tion of the resource that then results in the general obligation to
accede to the will of the person to whom the resource is allocat-
ed."
Those theories are interesting, not for the truth of the mat-
ters asserted, but for what light the theories shed on the values
and beliefs that animate those theorists' conceptions of those
types of obligations. This examination provides a method of con-
structing a theory of obligation based upon those identified com-
mon beliefs and values that cuts across artificial legal doctrinal
lines. The following discussion will demonstrate that the theoret-
ical debates about obligation creation and expectations about
"proper" human behavior center around values and beliefs re-
garding individual autonomy, proper restraints on that autono-
my, human rationality and human progress.'5 These underlying
values and beliefs can then be used to shed light on the courts'
compulsion to erect a barrier to the obligation altering bankrupt-
cy process.
A. Justification of Obligation in General
At the general level, theorists in contracts, torts and proper-
ty attempt to justify enforcing obligations for two types of rea-
sons. The first type of reason is that enforcing obligations creates
a societal good. The other type of reason is that enforcing obliga-
tions is necessary to respect the individual's moral right or ethi-
42. See infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 161-70 and accompanying text. Whether a society chooses a
private property regime, has a defensible method of allocation, and consciously as-
signs attributes to the concept of ownership, is a questionable point. Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1397-1400 (1993). A high level of
artificiality exists when speaking of "justifications" for the existing state of affairs.
The type of justifications made, however, provide insight into societal values and
beliefs.
45. As values and beliefs change over time, theorists' perceptions of why such
rules create legally enforceable obligations also change. Likewise, values and beliefs
in different cultures lead to different rationales for enforcing legal rules regarding
obligations in those cultures. This article will concentrate on the contract, property
and tort justification theories that have been proposed in the legal traditions of the
United States in the last century.
[Vol. 57
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cal development, regardless of the effect of such enforcement on
society at large.
1. Contracts
Justification theory at the general level has advanced both
social good and individual good as reasons for the enforcement of
contractual obligations. Two examples of justification theories
that rely on a social good as the reason for enforcing contractual
obligations are the utilitarian theory and the law and economics
theory. The justification theories that advance an individual good
focus on the respect for individual autonomy.
Utilitarian accounts of the binding nature of promises focus
on the social good that results from human cooperation." En-
forcing promises facilitates human cooperation by generating
reliance on and trust in promises.47 A particular promise need
not generate actual reliance to be enforceable. Rather, the proba-
bility of reliance and the fact that reliance in general is to be
encouraged provides a sufficient basis to make the promise en-
forceable."
The law and economics theorists49 focus on the social good
of efficiency, with efficiency defined as wealth or welfare maximi-
zation.5 ° Enforcing contracts maximizes wealth or welfare.51
Parties to contracts agree to an exchange based on their own
self-interest to maximize their own wealth or welfare.52 In addi-
tion, the ability to enforce exchanges enhances welfare and
wealth for society as a whole because resources are put to the
best use through the exchange of the resource to the person who
is willing to pay the most for the resource.53 Using this ratio-
46. P.S. ATrYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 31 (1981); see also Richard
Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 489, 509-10 (1989). (Both Rawls and Finnis use considerations of human coop-
eration as part of the background values of social good.)
47. ATIYAH, supra note 46, at 32.
48. See id. at 39-40, 63.
49. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 599, 604-14 (1989) (describing the development and some of the main tenets of
law and economics); see also Thomas S. Ulen, The Lessons of Law and Economics, J.
LEGAL ECON., Dec. 1992, at 103.
50. David Charney, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1824 (1991). For a criticism of wealth maximi-
zation as an ethical norm, see Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Virtue: Morality and Pro-
ductivity in Posner's Theory of Wealth Maximization, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 167 (1993).
51. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRACT LAW 1-2 (1979).
52. Id.
53. Id. According to Judge Posner, a leading law and economics theorist, "[Tihe
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nale, contracts in general should be enforced because such en-
forcement maximizes economic wealth.
Theorists who justify the enforcement of promises based
upon the respect for individual moral rights, as opposed to a
societal good, focus on the concept of individual autonomy. Two
theorists who advance autonomy-based theories are Charles
Fried and Randy Barnett.54
Fried's theory to justify enforcement of promises in general
is rooted firmly in the tenets of freedom from interference, self-
determination, and responsibility.55 The enforceability of a
promise rests on something other than benefit to another, reli-
ance by another, or a communication of intention to another.56
Benefit, reliance or communication are neither necessary nor
sufficient to justify enforcing a promise even though they nor-
mally are present when promises are enforced.5 7 The additional
concepts which are necessary and sufficient for enforcing promis-
es are the values of individual autonomy, and trust in and re-
spect for others.58 In Fried's words:
In order that I be as free as possible, that my will have the
greatest possible range consistent with the similar will of oth-
ers, it is necessary that there be a way in which I may commit
myself. It is necessary that I be able to make nonoptional a
course of conduct that would otherwise be optional for me. By
doing this I can facilitate the projects of others, because I can
make it possible for those others to count on my future conduct,
fundamental function of contract law . . . is to deter people from behaving
opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to encourage optimal tim-
ing of economic activity and . . . obviate costly self-protective measures." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 91 (4th ed. 1992).
54. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION 57 (1981) ("The moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties
are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be."); Randy E. Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COL. L. REv. 269, 297 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett,
Consent Theory] (arguing that contract law is part of the concept of entitlements
which has the function of "facilitating freedom of human action and interaction"); see
Charney, supra note 50, at 1823 (stating that enforcement promotes autonomy of
persons by enabling them to bind themselves to a promise); see also Randy E.
Barnett, Some Problems With Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022, 1023-
24 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, Contract as Promise] (describing Professor E. Allan
Farnsworth's and Professor Samuel Williston's promotion of a will-based conception of
contract).
55. FRIED, supra note 54, at 7-8. See Barnett, Contract as Promise, supra note
54, at 1023-24 (arguing promise theory implements liberal principles of freedom to
contract and freedom from contract).
56. FRIED, supra note 54, at 11.
57. Id. at 9-11.
58. Id. at 13, 16-17.
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and thus those others can pursue more intricate, more far-
reaching projects. If it is my purpose, my will that others be
able to count on me in the pursuit of their endeavor, it is essen-
tial that I be able to deliver myself into their hands more firm-
ly than where they simply predict my future course.
An individual is morally bound to keep his prom-
ises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose
function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for another to
expect the promised performance. To renege is to abuse a confi-
dence he was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally
did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like)
lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended
to invoke the bonds of trust.59
Fried's theory of the binding force of promise is necessarily sub-
jective because it is based on the principle of autonomy from the
perspective of the promisor." To impose an obligation in the
absence of a subjective promise would violate the autonomy
principle.61
Barnett, on the other hand, advocates an autonomy-based
theory that has both objective and subjective components." His
consent theory of contracts is based upon entitlements theory.'
Entitlements theory based on individual rights is used "to define
the boundaries within which individuals may live, act, and pur-
sue happiness free of the forcible interference of others."' Con-
tracts is that body of law used to transfer entitlements and to
enforce those transfers. 5 Once someone holds an entitlement,
the holder's consent is a necessary prerequisite to be legally obli-
gated to transfer that right.6 This consent requirement protects
the promisor's individual autonomy over the right to the
entitlement. 7
59. Id. at 13, 16 (citations omitted).
60. See id. at 89 (explaining that even though contract duties may arise on a
background of social convention, the search is still for the parties' actual agreement).
61. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 272; Charney, supra note 50, at
1825.
62. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 301.
63. Id. at 292.
64. Id. at 291.
65. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 295. Before contract law can be
used to transfer entitlements, those entitlements must be vested in someone. Id. at
297. That original vesting is not a matter of contract law, but a matter of property
law. Id. at 296 & n.113, 297 & n.115.
66. Id. at 297-99.
67. Id.
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Fried and Barnett part company on the issue of whether a
binding obligation should be created if the parties do not actually
subjectively agree to be bound. Fried would say that a promise
has not been made and thus no contract obligation exists. 8
Barnett would look not only at the subjective agreement or non-
agreement of the parties but also at the objective indications of
an agreement between the parties.69 Thus Barnett defines con-
sent as a "manifestation of an intention to alienate rights."7"
Even though a party may not have the actual subjective intent to
be bound, a contractual obligation arises if the party has by word
or contract manifested an intent to be bound. 7' Barnett portrays
the objective portion of the consent definition as integral to the
protection of "the rights and liberty interests of others ....""
Thus, Barnett views autonomy from the perspective of the prom-
isee as well as the promisor.73 Whether or not a person has man-
ifested an intention to be bound depends in large part on com-
munity conventions regarding language and conduct.7 4
2. Tort
In tort theory, the justification issue at the general level is
whether an individual should be obligated to another party who
has been injured in an interaction between the two parties. Jus-
tification theorists use either a social good or an individual good
68. See FRIED, supra note 54, at 88-89. Fried, however, does not discount the
possibility that non-contractual principles such as reliance and restitution might pro-
vide recovery. Id. at 89-90.
69. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 301.
70. Id. at 304.
71. Id. at 305-06.
72. Id. at 306.
73. See id. at 307.
74. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 307-08. One of the criticisms of
Barnett's consent theory is that it does not provide a justification for reliance on
community conventions as a source of objective manifestations of consent. See Rich-
ard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489, 525 (1989). Barnett attempted to use consent theory to justify
community conventions as default or background rules in Randy E. Barnett, The
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 829
(1992) (explaining that conventionalist rules serve functions of consent because (i)
likely to reflect subjective agreement of the parties and (ii) when parties are not
equally informed about background rules, conventionalist rules will provide incentive
to educate less informed persons). For criticism of Barnett's explanation, see Law-
rence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV.
169, 173 (1993) (arguing that principles of autonomy and the will theory of contracts
requires nonsubstantive default rules). For another approach to default rules, see
Charney, supra note 50.
[Vol. 57
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rationale to support imposing a tort obligation. Two social good
justifications that have been advanced are reducing the cost of
accidents or spreading the risk of loss among all members of so-
ciety.75
Law and economics theorists focus on accident cost reduction
in imposing tort liability. The goal of tort law should be to
achieve the optimal level of accidents.76 Tort liability should be
imposed when the cost of accidents is more than the cost of
avoiding the accident at the margins.77 Rational people will
want to avoid accidents when the cost of accidents is more than
the cost of safety.78 Imposing liability will encourage people to
exercise the proper amount of care.79 The concept of causation
serves to connect the injured person with the actor in order to
achieve the proper balance of social costs and benefits to influ-
ence the parties' behavior.8 ° This economic explanation is not
concerned with preventing all accidents, only with internalizing
and balancing of the relative costs and benefits of accidents to
75. These are not the only two instrumental justifications offered. For example,
one author has advanced the position that tort law is a dispute resolution mecha-
nism that operates when one party has violated social norms. Steven D. Smith, The
Critics and the 'Crisis. A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 COR-
NELL L. REV. 765 (1987).
76. POSNER, supra note 53, § 6.1, at 163-65; Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics
of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 930-31 (1994).
77. HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A
STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW 51 (1987). As Posner states:
[E]xpected accident costs and accident costs must be compared at the mar-
gin, by measuring the costs and benefits of small increments in safety and
stopping investing in more safety at the point where another dollar spent
would yield a dollar or less in added safety.
POSNER, supra note 53, § 6.1, at 164.
78. Weston, supra note 76, at 931. The law and economics school of thought is
thus squarely within the utilitarian mode of justification. STEINER, supra note 77, at
45. As Professor Fletcher wrote in describing tort liability in the 19th century: 'The
test for justifying risks became a straightforward utilitarian comparison of the bene-
fits and costs of the defendant's risk-creating activity. The assumption emerged that
reasonable men do what is justified by a utilitarian calculus, that justified activity is
lawful, and that lawful activities should be exempt from tort liability." George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 563-64 (1972).
For a criticism of the tort liability system as an inefficient mechanism for creating
the optimal level of human behavior, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With
Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 559-90 (1985).
79. POSNER, supra note 53, § 6.2, at 167-68.
80. POSNER, supra note 53, § 6.7, at 182-87; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229 (1987) ("If the purpose of tort law
is to promote economic efficiency, a defendant's conduct will be deemed the cause of
an injury when making him liable for the consequences of the injury will promote an
efficient allocation of resources to safety and care."); Weston, supra note 76, at 928-
29.
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achieve the optimal level of accidents.8
A different social good is achieved through loss spreading.
This justification focuses on tort liability as a mechanism to
spread the loss suffered in an accident across society as a whole
rather than letting the cost lie where it originally fell.82 The
mechanisms for such loss spreading are not necessarily hinged to
any sort of factual causation analysis that connects the actor to
the injured party, but could be accomplished through mecha-
nisms such as insurance or administrative regulation. 3 Loss
spreading results in a social good since injured persons are com-
pensated without the expenditure of resources in proving causa-
tion or fault."' Proponents of this conception of the social good
advocate far reaching reforms of the tort system because of per-
ceived inconsistencies between the goal of loss spreading and
current tort doctrine.8 5
Several theorists advance justifications for imposing tort
liability based moral grounds. 6 These theorists often employ
variants on the idea of corrective justice. 7 Corrective justice as
a justification for imposing tort liability can be defined in various
ways," but a common definition is that a party who wrongfully
imposes losses on another party is bound to provide a remedy to
the injured party for those wrongful losses. 9 The flexible word
81. Weston, supra note 76, at 932; Neil K Komesar, Injuries and Institutions:
Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 26 & n.9 (1990). For a
critique of this rationale, see Sugarman, supra note 78, at 559-90 (critiquing econom-
ic view as overemphasizing the real deterrent effect of imposing liability); Howard A.
Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677
(1985) (critiquing economic view that posits that people are informed rational cost
benefit analysts in making decisions about their behavior).
82. Weston, supra note 76, at 939-41; Sugarman, supra note 78, at 591-603
(critiquing the current tort system as an inefficient means of loss spreading combined
with compensation of the injured party).
83. Weston, supra note 76, at 939-41. But see Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Law De-
bate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of
Compensation, 79 VA_ L. REV. 91, 139-41 (1993) (criticizing one aspect of the insur-
ance theory used to decide what risks a person would want to insure against).
84. Weston, supra note 76, at 940-41.
85. See Weston, supra note 76, at 942-47; Sugarman, supra note 78, at 648-64
(advocating combination of government taxes to provide compensation to injured and
to spread the loss and government regulation to provide proper level of safety).
86. Weston, supra note 76, at 957.
87. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV.
449, 449 (1992); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
625, 627-29 (1992).
88. Wright, supra note 87, at 627-29.
89. Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 427, 440-41 (1992).
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18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/2
1996] BANKRUPTCY & OBLIGATION THEORY 67
"wrongful" allows theorists to ascribe different meaning to that
word and thereby develop different justifications for imposing
tort liability.
Stephen Perry focuses on causation ° and fault to define
"wrongful" and justifies imposing liability if causation and fault
exist.91 He argues that injury in tort is a setback to one's per-
sonal autonomy.92 Both the person who inflicted the injury and
the person who suffered the injury are responsible for that injury
because both have personal autonomy to act in such a way that
injury results.93 This idea of responsibility is causally based.94
But that responsibility alone is an insufficient reason for shifting
the loss from the injured party to the other person involved in
the injury.9" According to Perry, the moral principle justifying
shifting such losses is fault.96
90. Richard Epstein has advanced the view that physical causation determines
whether the loss is wrongful. This view is based on underlying premises of absolute
property rights and individual autonomy. Richard A. Epstein, Causation-in Context:
An Afterword, 63 CHi-KENT L. REV. 653, 654 (1987) [hereinafter Epstein, Causa-
tion--in Context]. When someone interferes with those rights through the use of
physical force, Epstein argues that the actor should be liable for the resulting losses.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMATION OF
TORT LAW 22-29 (1980); Weston, supra note 76, at 970, 972. Epstein also has argued
that the concept of assumption of the risk is a "central limitation on the role of
causation in general tort theory." Epstein, Causation-in Context, supra, at 674. The
causation concept is most important in cases involving strangers. The ability of par-
ties to contract about the allocation of risk reduces the role of pure causation in
imposing liability and applies to many cases including products liability and medical
malpractice. Id. at 675.
91. An early proponent of a theory based upon these ideas was George
Fletcher. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537 (1972). He argued that tort liability was imposed when the actor imposed a non-
reciprocal level of risk on others. The principle at the base of this liability was that
all individuals have the right to roughly the same degree of security from risk. Com-
pensation was required whenever the distribution of risk injured someone who was
subject to more than that person's fair share of risk. Id. at 550-51. The concept of
fault connected the party causing the harm with the need to compensate for that
harm. Id. at 551. Determining fault depended upon what type of behavior could be
fairly demanded from an individual in that situation. Id. at 553.
92. Perry, supra note 87, at 498.
93. See Perry, supra note 87, at 498.
94. Id. at 497-98.
95. Id. at 499. Jules Coleman advocates a view that causation is what deter-
mines whether the agent should repair the wrongful loss. He states:
Corrective justice imposes on wrongdoers the duty to repair the wrongful
losses their conduct occasions.
* * . What grounds that duty? ... The duty to correct the losses
derives not from the agent's having done the wrong as such, but from the
losses being in an appropriate sense the agent's responsibility. They are the
consequences of agency: the agent's causal powers. They are his fault.
Coleman, supra note 89, at 442-43.
96. Perry, supra note 87, at 499. Coleman argues that "[t]he wrong does not
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Notions of fault are based on "epistemic considerations, in
the form of belief in or actual or constructive knowledge of causal
irregularities . . . ." One such belief is that people have control
or the possibility of control over their actions. 8 Another belief is
the existence of a primary moral obligation "not to intentionally
or knowingly harm or attempt to harm the person or property of
another, or to intentionally or knowingly subject either his per-
son or property to a substantial degree of risk of harm ... with-
out justification for doing so."' This moral obligation provides a
reason for imposing responsibility for the injury on the person
who is causally connected to the injury and said to be at fault
using this principle. 1°'
Ernest Weinrib finds justification for shifting losses from
one party to another by comparing the fundamental principles of
Aristotle's conception of corrective justice to the fundamental
principles of tort law. Aristotle's idea of corrective justice is
based upon equality of persons and the nature of relationships as
bipolar.1"' Weinrib argues that the fundamental ordering con-
cepts used in imposing tort liability are the bipolar relationship
of the parties and causation which provide the link between the
two parties involved in the interaction.0 2 Weinrib argues that
the principles of corrective justice can be used to justify tort
obligations because corrective justice is based upon the same bi-
polar, causation and equality principles.0 3
ground the duty to repair. Rather, it grounds the claim that the losses are wrongful
and thus within the ambit of corrective justice." Coleman, supra note 89, at 443.
97. Perry, supra note 87, at 505.
98. Id. at 505.
99. Id. at 507.
100. Id. at 508. But see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liabili-
ty for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990) (arguing that corrective justice
principles can support a no-causation standard).
101. Weinrib states:
Corrective justice embraces: a bipolar conception of interaction that relates
the doer of harm to the sufferer of that harm; a bipolar conception of injus-
tice as a violation of quantitative equality; a bipolar conception of damage
as a loss by the plaintiff correlative to the defendant's gain; a bipolar con-
ception of the adjudicative process as a vindication of the quantitative
equality of the litigants; and a bipolar conception of the remedy as the
annulment of the parties' correlative gain and loss.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 411 (1992).
102. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 494
(1989) [hereinafter Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law]; see also Ernest J. Weinrib,
Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987) [hereinafter Weinrib,
Causation] (discussing the linkage of parties through wrongdoing and causation).
103. Weinrib, supra note 101, at 404; Weston, supra note 76, at 991-92. Weinrib
also links Aristotle's conception of corrective justice to Kant's and Hegel's ideas of
[Vol. 57
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In sum, both Perry and Weinrib use causation as a funda-
mental concept to connect the injurer to the injured party in tort
law. Perry advances the further principle of fault based upon not
subjecting others to an unreasonable risk of harm. Weinrib,
however, focuses on the bipolar relationship and equality of per-
sons to justify imposing liability on another person for harm.
3. Property
In property theory, the justification issue at the general level
is whether others should be obligated to respect an allocation of
resources to an individual, that is, the justification of a private
property regime." Both social goods and individual goods have
been advanced as justifications for private property. Justification
theories based on social good have been advanced on utilitarian,
economic, libertarian, or civic republican principles.
Utilitarian and economic principles focus on the social good
of the best or most efficient use of resources. In utilitarian terms,
the total average welfare or happiness of the society will be
greater if resources are privately owned."5 This greater happi-
natural right as all three focus on the bipolar relationship of "doing and suffering."
Weinrib, supra note 101, at 424. He identifies Kant's idea of natural right that the
action of one party must be consistent with the freedom of the other. He identifies
Hegel's idea of abstract right as a "prohibition against wronging the physical and
proprietary embodiments of someone else's will." Id. at 423; see also Coleman, supra
note 89, at 443-44 (arguing that requiring the injurer to rectify the loss is not re-
quired in a corrective justice justification, but allows for other parties to discharge
the duty imposed on the injurer to rectify the loss).
104. A private property regime has as a foundational concept the idea that a
resource belongs to a particular person and that particular person has the right to
determine how a resource will be used. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 39. The concept
of belonging or ownership of a resource does not necessarily translate into a pre-
scribed set of attributes of ownership. Id. at 47-55. That is, a person can be said to
own a resource, but not have absolute unfettered power regarding that resource. For
example, a person can own a piece of equipment but not be allowed to use that
equipment in a way that pollutes the surrounding environment, even if the environ-
ment that is polluted belongs to the same person. The attributes of ownership which
include the rights, liberties, powers and immunities in regard to a particular resource
are not automatically defined by the concept of a resource belonging to a particular
person. Id. at 52. The law of property and lawyers' discussions of property are pri-
marily concerned with defining the attributes of ownership. Id. See also Richard A.
Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2 (1990) (explaining
that property law is concerned with the power of the individual to possess, use and
dispose of resources).
105. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 6; LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 57-65 (1980); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRrVATE PROPERTY:
THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 239-42 (1973); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Function of
Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POLy 62 (1992) (stating
that private ownership solves problems of knowledge, incentive, and power).
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ness or welfare results from the incentive individuals have to
reap the benefit from use of resources." 6 In economic terms, a
resource should be owned by a particular person because that
ownership creates incentives to put the resource to its best
use. °7 Ownership usually means exclusive power to control the
use of that resource.108 Private ownership provides a greater
ability to account for the costs of use and make better decisions
about the most productive use of the resource using a cost-bene-
fit analysis.0 9 Both the utilitarian and economic arguments jus-
tify the private property regime because of the effect of such a
regime in producing the best use of resources. This conception of
private property is said to bring about economic prosperity, or
the creation of wealth, in a society.1
Another justification for a private property regime based
upon a social good is that private property advances the liberty
interest of the individual which in turn advances political liberty
in society. John Locke's theory of property' is based on the
idea that individual ownership allows the individual to survive
and serves the individual's comfort and convenience.1 As am-
106. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 6; BECKER, supra note 105, at 65; ALAN RYAN,
PROPERTY 53-60 (1987).
107. POSNER, supra note 53, § 3.1, at 32-33; BECKER, supra note 105, at 68-69.
But see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 774-81 (1986) (arguing the needs of commer-
cial activity required public ownership of certain types of resources and such owner-
ship is the highest and best use of those resources).
108. POSNER, supra note 53, at 34. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying
text. For a criticism of the economic justification of this attribute, see BECKER, supra
note 105, at 71-74.
109. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 8 (citing Harold Demselz, Theory of Property
Rights, AM. ECON. REV.: PROC. & PAPERS 351-353 (1967)).
110. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
907, 911-13 (1993). For a critique that suggests that utilitarianism denigrates rather
than justifies the institution of private property, see RYAN, supra note 106, at 91-117
(arguing that if private property rights must yield to the general welfare, the utili-
tarian argument exalts the effectiveness of the security of property as advancing the
general welfare more than the equality of property, thus a choice is made on moral
as opposed to utilitarian grounds).
111. Locke's conception of property was very broad, including personal rights
such as liberty and security. RYAN, supra note 106, at 158; David Schultz, Political
Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Political
Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 472 (1993) (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIS-
ES OF GOVERNMENT 88 (1963)).
112. A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 243-52 (1992);
WALDRON, supra note 41, at 157. Waldron criticizes this argument because Locke
failed to take into account community based use of resources, presenting as the only
choice, private ownership and use or no use at all. Id. at 168-71. According to Locke,
the role of government was to protect and defend natural property rights.
SCHIATER, supra note 105, at 160. Locke's defense of private property is based in
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plified by those using Locke's theory, because such individual
ownership promotes the individual's survival, individual owner-
ship of property promotes the individual's personal and political
liberty.'13 As Waldron explains, the attributes of ownership,
such as exclusive use of and power over a resource, promotes
freedom of choice regarding that resource's use in the economic
sphere. The ability to control the material environment is just as
important to individual freedom as the political environment." 4
Additionally, such control helps protect individual privacy in the
sense of not having to answer to society regarding the use of
resources."' Private property regimes promote the indepen-
dence of individuals from each other,"' self assertion and recog-
nition by others,"7 the ability to make choices regarding de-
sires or needs," and individual responsibility for the conse-
quences of decisions regarding resource use."9 These personal
freedoms are in turn said to foster the political freedom of an
individual to stand up to the tyranny of government. 20
Civic republicanism theory also regards private property as
essential to the liberty interest of individuals. Civic republican-
ism is based upon a more communitarian, as opposed to individ-
ualistic, conception of the common good. Persons participate in
public affairs and should have the liberty to do so to advance the
common good, not the individual good. As Professor Michelman
wrote:
In republican thought, the normative character of politics de-
part on a theory of natural rights. Id. at 158-61.
113. Schultz, supra note 111, at 473; Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An
Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 138 (1990); BECKER, supra note 105, at 75-80; Ellickson,
supra note 44, at 1352.
114. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 294. As Becker points out, the argument to
justify a system of private property based upon a liberty interest of individuals does
not necessarily translate into the full panoply of exclusive rights that Waldron posits.
Such a liberty interest may instead allow restrictions on exclusive rights when such
exclusivity may interfere with another person's liberty. BECKER, supra note 105, at
77-78.
115. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 295.
116. Id. at 301.
117. Id. at 301-02.
118. Id. at 305-06.
119. Id. at 310-13. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitu-
tionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 744-52 (1986) (identifying the
same set of values served by property rules as six functions: use value, welfare,
personhood, protection, allocative, and sovereignty).
120. Schultz, supra note 111, at 473; Underkuffler, supra note 113, at 138. But
see WALDRON, supra note 41, at 313-18 (criticizing the assertion of a relationship
between individual personal freedom and political freedom).
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pends on the independence of mind and judgment, the authen-
ticity of voice, and-in some versions of republicanism-the
diversity or "plurality" of views that citizens bring to "the de-
bate of the commonwealth." Republicanism has been, par excel-
lence, the strain in constitutional thought that has been sensi-
tive to both the dependence of good politics on social and eco-
nomic conditions capable of sustaining "an informed and active
citizenry that would not permit its government either to exploit
or dominate one part of society or to become its instrument,"
and the dependence of such conditions, in turn, on the legal
order. These perceptions irresistibly motivate a republican
attachment to rights. These include, most obviously, rights of
speech and of property. They may also include privacy
rights-perhaps stronger ones than many contemporary liberals
would welcome."l
Private property is necessary to facilitate such participatory
citizenship motivated by a concern for the public good.122 This
view of property was wide-spread during the revolutionary
founding of the United States and helped inform the debate over
the constitutional protections of property."=
Theorists also justify a private property regime based upon
the principle that individual ownership of private property is
necessary for the moral and ethical development of a person,
regardless of its effect on society at large. Hegel's explication of
property is one example of this type of justification.24 Peter
121. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1504-05 (1988) (cita-
tions omitted); accord Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.
J. 1539, 1547-58 (1988). For a critique of civic republicanism, see Steven G. Gey, The
Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993); Miriam
Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral
Foundations of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994).
122. Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 286 (1991); Sunstein, supra note 110, at 914-17;
William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991). At
least one writer has used republican thought to argue for minimal entitlements to
private property. Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 36 (1990).
123. See generally Alexander, supra note 122; Michelman, supra note 121, at
1515-24; Sunstein, supra note 121, at 1558-64. As commerce developed, and property
became commodified, the role of property changed to the more individualistic notion
of satisfying needs and advancing individual autonomy. Alexander, supra note 122, at
329. As the change in the conception of property changed to a more individual au-
tonomy approach, the virtue that used to be associated with participation in public
life became associated with individual productivity. Id. at 325.
124. Peter G. Stillman, Hegel's Analysis of Property in the 'Philosophy of Right,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1035 n.21 (1989) ("Property is a matter of right and thus
intrinsic to freedom. Hegel thus rejects consequentialist arguments for (or against)
[Vol. 57
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Stillman explains Hegel's justification of private property as
follows:
[I]n owning property, men act in the external world. Property is
freedom because it gives the individual a scope for action and
makes it possible for him to extend and expand his personality.
Through their property, human beings dominate na-
ture-liberating themselves from its toils-and create social
institutions. In shaping the natural and the social world accord-
ing to their intentions and goals, men develop and express their
own capabilities. In reflecting on the results of their actions,
men educate themselves about the world of actuality and about
themselves-and thereby prepare themselves for additional
action. Property, the embodiment of the free will in the world,
is essential for human beings if they are to attain a developed
freedom and individuality.
125
Margaret Jane Radin is a modern day theorist who builds upon
Hegel's theory to argue that private property is integral to an
individual's conception of self.126
Under private property justification theories, ownership
usually means exclusive power to control the use of that re-
source. Attributes of ownership revolve around the rights of
possession, use and disposition. 127 The utilitarian and economic
property and insists on private property regardless of its relation to happiness, to
the satisfaction of needs, to efficiency or an increase in value, and to utility in any
sense.").
125. Id. at 1036. In using the term property, Stillman means private property.
Id. at 1031 n.1. Waldron explains Hegel's approach to property and individual moral
development as follows:
Property-owning is said to be important to the human individual since it is
only through owning and controlling property that he can embody his will
in external objects and begin to transcend the subjectivity of his immediate
existence. In working on an object, using it, and having control over it, an
individual confers on his will a stability and a maturity that would not oth-
erwise be possible, and enables himself to establish his place as one in a
community of wills .... Hegel is adamant that property is necessary: un-
less he can establish himself as an owner, an individual's development in
other areas of ethical life will be seriously at risk.
WALDRON, supra note 41, at 377-38; see also RYAN, supra note 106, at 21-25. For a
critique of this theory, see ALAN CARTER, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS 89-98 (1989).
126. MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35 (1993) ('the premise
underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development-to
be a person-an individual needs some control over resources in the external environ-
ment.").
127. See BECKER, supra note 105, at 18-21 (listing the following attributes of
ownership based on A.M. Honore's listing: the right to possess, the right to use, the
right to manage, the right to the income, the right to the capital, the right to se-
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theorists advocate near absolute rights of possession, use and
disposition. In economic terms, in a world without costs, in order
to have the proper incentives to put property to its highest and
best use, the designated owner of property must have exclusive
control over those rights. 2 ' Vesting absolute rights in the des-
ignated owner fulfills the greatest welfare because absolute
rights promote certainty, stability and the incentive to use prop-
erty wisely.129
Richard Epstein also advocates an almost absolute set of
property rights using Locke's liberty based argument." Ep-
stein argues that a property owner's rights to possession, use
and disposition are not subject to interference without consent or
compensation.'' The only limitation explicitly recognized is
that the right to use property must not result in an unreasonable
interference with another person's right to use their own
property.'32 Epstein traces these rights to his understanding of
Locke's argument that government's obligation is to protect a
person's natural property rights from interference." The "nat-
ural" attributes of ownership, according to Epstein, are the abso-
lute rights of possession, use and disposition without interfer-
ence from others and without interference in another's similar
rights in their own property."3
curity, the power of transmissibility, the absence of a term, the prohibition of harm-
ful use, the liability to execution and the residuary character).
128. POSNER, supra note 53, § 3.1, at 33-34; Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1326-
30. Most property systems do not entail such exclusive attributes of ownership for all
types of resources because the cost of enforcing such rights in some cases exceeds
the benefits received from enforcing those rights. POSNER, supra note 53, § 3.2, at
35-37; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 932-33 (1985). Some examples of types of resources
where the rights of use, possession and disposition are not absolute are oil, gas, and
water rights. In those cases, the costs of enforcing exclusive rights is high in compar-
ison to the benefits of enforcing such exclusive rights. Richard A. Epstein, Property
as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187, 196-200 (1992).
129. ALLAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 54-56 (1984).
130. See RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 58-63 (1985) [hereinafter, EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; Richard A. Epstein,
An Outline of 'Takings', 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 3, 8 (1986); RADIN, supra note 126, at
121.
131. See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 130, at 58-62; Epstein, supra note 128, at
194-95.
132. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 130, at 60; see Epstein, supra note 128, at
195.
133. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 130, at 61. On the Lockean view of the role
of government in protecting property rights, see SIMMONS, supra note 112, at 315,
317.
134. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 130, at 59-62; RADIN, supra note 126, at 121.
Critics of Epstein's theory argue that what are accepted attributes of the status of
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Radin argues that the concept of the relationship between
property and personhood means that the protection of property
rights might vary depending upon the particular property at
issue and the strength of its relationship to the development of
personhood. Those rights most closely related to personhood
would deserve more protection. 13 5 Radin argues that the nor-
mative inquiry is whether a restriction on the owner's exercise of
an attribute of use, possession, or disposition is allowable. Radin
thus starts with a general rule that no interference with those
attributes is allowed. Radin, however, uses a different criterion
than the other types of justifications for private property to de-
termine whether a restriction is allowable. Whether a restriction
is allowable depends on how essential to personhood the attrib-
ute is in relation to the type of property at issue. The more es-
sential the property and the ownership attributes are to
ownership are subject to evolving social context regarding the degree of protection
accorded those attributes. They further argue that Epstein has not sufficiently justi-
fied his trilogy of "natural" property rights. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Consti-
tution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 29-31 (1986); Margaret J. Radin, The Consequence of
Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 239 (1986).
Joseph Singer critiques this understanding of property as premised on a free
market system which does not in fact exist. See Singer, supra note 40, at 644-52.
According to Singer, the components of the free market myth center around individu-
al consent and freedom from government control and private coercion. Id. at 646-47.
These components do not in fact exist. Whether consent is necessary depends upon
the initial allocation of rights. That allocation of rights in turn depends upon social
and moral values. Id. at 647-49. Ultimately the entity that decides whether to en-
force rights or refuse to recognize and enforce such rights is the government. Id. at
650-52. Thus the whole idea of a free market is a construct built upon implicit un-
stated premises that cannot be justified without looking explicitly at normative val-
ues. For another critique of the idea that ownership means the exclusive right to
possession, use and control, see JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD
AN EGALrrARIAN THEORY OF OWNERSHIP (1994).
135. RADIN, supra note 126, at 53. But see Stephen J. Schnably, Property and
Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 347 (1993) (critiquing Radin's dichotomy because it is based on a view of con-
sensual values that might be used to define where on the continuum particular types
of property interests may fall). For Radin's reply to Schnably's critique see Margaret
J. Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L. REV. 409
(1993).
At the opposite extreme from the absolute ownership attributes is the
positivist approach to those attributes. This approach has as the central idea that
the only reason an owner is able to exercise any rights of ownership at all is the
grace of the enforcing entity, i.e. the government. In this view, all attributes of own-
ership exist only because the government allows those attributes to exist and does so
for reasons unrelated to the justification for having private property rights. See Sing-
er, supra note 40, at 641-44; Robert P. Burns, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute"
Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67, 75-78 (1985). None of the justifications for
a private property regime use a positivist approach in describing the attributes of
ownership.
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personhood, the less acceptable are restrictions on those attrib-
utes.3 ' Radin's analysis requires a context specific inquiry be-
fore one can argue that a particular restriction on an ownership
attribute is justified.'37
B. Justification for Imposing Obligation in Specific Factual
Situations
Even though enforcing obligations in general might be justi-
fied according to the above rationales, those rationales do not
necessarily provide a justification for imposing an obligation in a
particular fact situation. The type of justification for imposing
obligation in general, however, influences the type of argument
made for imposing obligations in particular situations. This part
explores the rationales for imposing obligations in specific fact
situations.
1. Contract
In contract theory, the justification at the specific level is
focused on the question of whether a particular interaction
should create a binding contractual obligation. To determine
whether a particular interaction should result in a contractual
obligation, the theorists often use the justification at the general
level as the foundation for deciding that an obligation should be
imposed in a specific situation.
At the general level, utilitarian theory focuses on the possi-
bility of reliance to justify enforcing promises."3 Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 provides expression for the idea that a
promisee's justifiable and reasonable reliance on a promise is a
justification for enforcing that promise.'39
136. RADIN, supra note 126, at 139-42. Radin's theory has some appeal in the
debtor and creditor context in the area of exemptions. Most states provide that cer-
tain types of property are exempt from creditor's service of execution and sale of
that property to satisfy debt. The types of property so exempt tend to be personal
items without much market value for the creditor, but with personal value for the
debtor. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (West 1995).
137. Some theorists extend this argument to advocate that it is a human right
for all persons to own property. For a further explanation and critique of this argu-
ment, see WALDRON, supra note 41, at 377-89, 423-45.
138. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
139. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of
the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1262 (1980) (analyzing reliance argument
from a law and economics perspective). But see Daniel A. Farber & John H.
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 'Invisible Handshake',
52 U. CHi. L. REv. 903, 905 (1985) (promise is critical in reliance cases); Edward
[Vol. 57
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The law and economics theorists rely on consideration as a
screening device to determine if particular promises should be
enforced."4 The economic justification for enforcing contracts in
general focused on the idea of exchange to produce wealth.14'
Consideration is evidence of an exchange and a bargain creating
an obligation. 42 Consideration is a formal requirement that
purportedly serves the functions of providing evidence, instilling
caution in the parties, and providing a clear mechanism for par-
ties to know which agreements are enforceable."
Yoris & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 113
(1991) (promise is basis of reliance cases). See also ATIYAH, supra note 46, at 66-69
(arguing that laying the blame for the harm from a promisee's reliance on the promi-
sor needs an additional justification, that is, actual and reasonable reliance alone
does not justify placing the cost of reliance on the promisor). "The extra element, it
is suggested, is compliance with some socially accepted values which determine when
expectations and/or reliance are sufficiently justifiable to be given some measure of
protection." Id. at 67. This additional justification based upon social values is neces-
sary because all promises on which a promisee might actually and reasonably rely
are not enforced. Id. at 67. According to Atiyah, utilitarian justifications for the bind-
ing nature of promises do not answer the question whether a particular promise
should be enforced. The dichotomy between the individual "good" and the social
"good" is often times too great. That is, while it might be a social good to enforce
promises in general, it might not be in the parties' (or at least one party's) best
interests to enforce this particular promise. Id. at 77-86.
140. POSNER, supra note 53, § 4.2, at 96-97.
141. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
142. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (explaining consider-
ation as follows: "(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise.").
143. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLuM. L. REV. 799, 800-04
(1941); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1106, 1115-16 (1984) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Responsive Model]; POSNER,
supra note 53, § 4.2, at 96-97 (listing several economic functions of the doctrine of
contract consideration: (i) reduction of the number of false suits; (ii) reduce inadver-
tent commitments; (iii) prevents society's resources from being spent on trivial prom-
ises or vague promises; (iv) prevents opportunistic behavior). For a critique of consid-
eration as not actually serving those functions, see James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue
about the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987 (1990); Mark B.
Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of Consid-
eration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 45 (1993); Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at
288-89 (criticizing consideration as not fulfilling that function and obscuring the un-
derlying substantive values that determine contract enforceability).
Some theorists make the argument that the fact of a bargain, exemplified in
the doctrine of consideration, justifies enforcement of promises in general rather than
as a screening device used to determine enforcement of particular promises. See
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 640 (1982)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration]; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 751 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
The Bargain Principle]; Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between
Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOwA L. REV. 769, 829 (1985);
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Fried and Barnett rely on autonomy based rationales for
enforcing contractual obligations in general and do not necessari-
ly advance a position on determining which promises are en-
forceable in particular contexts. One could extrapolate from the
above described theories, however, that under Fried's approach,
a court should enforce a promise if the party making the promise
subjectively agreed to be bound. Similarly extrapolating, under
Barnett's approach, a court should enforce a promise if evidence
exists that the party making the promise objectively manifested
an intent to be bound.
In the autonomy based justification, consideration may serve
to determine whether the parties have consented to a particular
bargain.'" Once the bargain exists, the bargain is enforced ac-
cording to its terms in order to put the aggrieved party in the
position they would have been in if the bargain had been per-
formed." Similarly, reasonable reliance on the promise may
serve to determine whether the parties have consented to be
bound by a particular promise.1
Eisenberg, The Responsive Model, supra, at 1112.
144. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 313.
145. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle, supra note 143, at 742.
146. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 54, at 314-15. Some theorists posit that
bargaining, represented by consideration and reasonable reliance itself, justifies en-
forcement of promises in general. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. See
also L. L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest and Contract Dam-
ages, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 62 (1936); P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 21-26 (1986);
Jay M. Feimnan, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REV. 678,
681-84 (1984); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 88 (1974).
The advocates of the bargain and reliance theories do not explicitly admit that
something other than the bargain or the reliance is the operative justification for
enforcing promises. Both bargain and reliance theories, however, implicitly use the
concept of reciprocity between the parties based on principles of fairness derived from
social norms. See Charney, supra note 50, at 1823-24; Eisenberg, The Responsive
Model, supra note 143, at 1111-12 (describing a model of contract law built upon
principle of fairness and policies of efficiency and administrability); James Gordley,
Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547 (1995) (arguing courts use the concepts of
bargain, consideration, and reliance to police the equality of exchange between the
parties). Some commentators who have considered contract excuse doctrine as part of
the theory of contractual obligation have focused on the issue of parties' consent as
augmented by social norms. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of
Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (1983); Sheldon W. Halpern, Applica-
tion of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for "the Wisdom of
Solomon", 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123 (1987). Unfortunately, the modern day proponents
of the bargain and reliance theories do not identify the operative social norms.
The traditional conception of bargain or reliance theories uses a discrete transactional
model of contracts, where the paradigm case is between two contracting parties for a
one-shot transaction. Ian MacNeil has developed a model of contract law based upon
relational exchanges as opposed to discrete exchanges. Robert W. Gordon, Macauley,
MacNeil and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L.
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2. Tort
In tort theory, justification at the general level is very much
intertwined with the question of whether an obligation should be
imposed in a particular fact situation. For example, if the justifi-
cation for tort obligations at the general level is to achieve the
optimal level of accidents,147 then liability should be imposed in
a specific fact situation whenever doing so will encourage that
optimal level of accidents. No additional justification is needed at
the specific level. Instead, at the specific level, tort theorists
debate whether a negligence based or a heightened liability stan-
dard should be imposed in a specific fact situation.'" A negli-
gence based standard would impose liability when the tortfeasor
failed to exercise the proper amount of care. 49 A heightened
standard would impose liability without consideration of the
amount of care exercised.'
The economic justification for imposing tort obligation sup-
ports both a negligence based standard and a heightened liabili-
ty standard. The economic argument that tort liability should be
imposed to encourage people to take care whenever the costs of
accidents outweighs the cost of safety supports imposing liability
whenever the actor does not actually exercise that amount of
REV. 565, 569-70. MacNeil's theory of contractual obligation is implicitly based upon
the concepts of autonomy and reciprocity based upon communitarian norms without a
strong defense of either or both as the linchpin of the enforceability of contract obli-
gations. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 7 (1980) [hereinafter MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT]
(elements of a promise are the will of the promisee and promisor, existence of a
present action to limit future choice, communication and measured reciprocity). See
generally Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian MacNeil's Rela-
tional Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1182-94, 1201-06 (1992); William C.
Whitford, Ian MacNeil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
545-49. MacNeil's normative principles are communitarian in nature. See MACNEIL,
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT supra, at 39-59; Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 488, 524 n.186 [hereinafter
MacNeil, Relational Contract]; Ian R. MacNeil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism and Commu-
nity-American Style, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 900, 936-39 (1984-85) [hereinafter MacNeil,
Bureaucracy]. MacNeil's focus is on advocating that more attention be paid to behav-
ioral norms that operate in a relational exchange. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance
of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1300-04 (1990).
147. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
148. STEINER, supra note 77, at 56-70; Allan C. Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73
CAL. L. REV. 755 (1985); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703 (1992);
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L.
REV. 39 (1994).
149. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 80, at 63.
150 Id.
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care."5 ' A heightened liability standard should be imposed if
activities cause harm without regard to the actor's exercise of
care or the potential victim's alteration of behavior to avoid the
harm.'52 The economic justification for imposing liability to re-
duce the cost of accidents supports a non-negligent or heightened
liability standard when either party cannot avoid the harm if the
activity is conducted.'53
The loss spreading rationale for imposing tort liability ac-
cords with a heightened liability standard rather than a negli-
gence based standard. Because the primary goal of imposing a
tort obligation is to spread the loss among members of society,
the defendant should be strictly liable for the harm when impos-
ing such liability on defendant is a good mechanism for spread-
ing the loss among a broader group of society. Imposing liabil-
ity only when the defendant fails to exercise the proper amount
of care under a negligence based standard will fail to adequately
spread the loss.'55
Under the corrective justice justification theories, the negli-
gence standard is the preferred standard. In Perry's words:
[W]hen common knowledge of the relevant casual regularities
would lead an agent of average mental capacities to be aware of
a sufficiently high level of risk of harm to other persons, taking
account of both the probability and seriousness of the outcome,
then the action should be treated for purposes of reparation as
faulty because it is more appropriate that the agent whose
action is being evaluated should bear the loss than that the
victim should. 5 '
When an action violates that standard, the actor is deemed at
fault. Perry's statement of the negligence standard is based on
objectifying the action taken and judging the action faulty for the
purpose of providing reparation to the injured party.'57 Accord-
ing to Weinrib, the idea of acting with reasonable care has two
aspects. 5 ' First, the reasonable care standard "recognizes that
151. POSNER, supra note 53, § 6.2, at 167.
152. Id. § 6.5, at 178 (strict liability for ultra hazardous activity).
153. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 80, at 70.
154. STEINER, supra note 77, at 62-63; Weston, supra note 76, at 943-44.
155. Plaintiffs are presumed to be unable to spread the loss as effectively as
defendants. STEINER, supra note 77, at 66.
156. Perry, supra note 87, at 509-10 (footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 509.
158. Weinrib assumes that each person has the volition to act in a way that has
the possibility of inflicting harm on another. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, supra
note 102, at 516.
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inherent in action is both the inevitability of risk creation and
the possibility of risk modulation."159 Second, using an objective
standard of reasonable care expresses the equal status of the
parties in the bipolar relationship, letting neither party's subjec-
tive capabilities control the other.6 0 Thus, both Perry and
Weinrib argue that the negligence standard is the correct stan-
dard for determining when tort liability should be imposed in
particular fact situations.
3. Property
At the specific level, the justification issue in property theory
focuses on the allocation of resources to particular individuals.
Unlike the contract and tort theories, property theories do not
necessarily connect the specific level justifications with the gen-
eral level justifications.
The allocation of particular resources to particular persons is
usually justified 6' in one of three ways: the labor theory, the
consent theory, and the possession theory. The labor theory,
derived from Locke's work, supposes that one acquires a right in
property by mixing one's labor with the resource. The act of
"mixing" establishes ownership of the resource. 6 ' This theory
seems to ultimately rest on a notion of just desert for labor ex-
pended."63 The consent theory posits that the owner gets the
right to a resource based on the consent of others."s This theo-
159. Id. at 519.
160. Id. Thus, Weinrib criticizes a strict liability regime as denying the legitima-
cy of acting and the equality of the parties in the relationship. Id. at 519-20.
161. The existing allocation of resources exists because of that mix of history,
politics and values regardless of whether that allocation is just under a particular
justification theory. See Baker, supra note 40, at 743 n.5; Richard A. Epstein, Posses-
sion as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1241-43 (1979).
162. SIMMONS, supra note 112, at 254-64. See RYAN, supra note 106, at 28-37;
see also WALDRON, supra note 41, at 171-94; Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin
of Property, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73-74 (1985); see generally SCHLArER, supra note
105, at 151-61 (placing Locke's labor theory in a historical context as a natural
rights theory of property).
163. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 201-207; BECKER, supra note 105, at 53-56
(Becker advances this argument to justify the existence of private property as well as
to justify the allocation of that property to a particular person). But see SIMMONS, su-
pra note 112, at 260-64 ("Mixing" argument for ownership rests on idea of people as
owners and stewards of resources in trust from God. Expending labor on a resource
in a fruitful way is good stewardship and in fulfillment of that trust). For a critique
of the labor-just desert theory, see CARTER, supra note 125, at 13-50.
164. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 149-51; Rose, supra note 162, at 74. See
SCHLATrER, supra note 105, at 127-29 (explaining the idea of Grotins that the intro-
duction of property arose from agreement).
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ry uses resource allocation as a means of conflict resolution. 65
Finally, the possession theory, sometimes called first occupancy
theory, is based on the idea that the first person to possess a
resource has the right to that resource.' The possession theo-
ry is the theory often followed in court decisions regarding appro-
priation of a resource from the wild.167 Peter Benson has con-
nected the possession theory to the moral development theory
based on Hegel's justification of private property." In order to
exercise human will on things and thus be fully human, a person
needs to connect with a thing in some way. A person can acquire
an exclusive right over the thing by exercising her will on the
thing and bringing the thing under her control as long as such
control is exercised prior to another person's exercise of will
relative to that thing."9 Respecting a person's exercise of will is
integral to respecting the moral development of that person.170
IV. SYNTHESIS OF A THEORY OF OBLIGATION
Each of the justification theories described above are united
by four major assumptions that fall into the categories of values
(something thought to be a good) or beliefs (something thought to
be true). These assumptions provide a method for synthesizing
the obligation theories described above into a single theory of
obligation. These four assumptions are individual autonomy, the
need for restraint on that autonomy, human rationality, and the
capacity for human progress.
A. Individual Autonomy and Restraint on Autonomy
Individual autonomy means the freedom to act or not to act.
Autonomy can be both a value (something thought to be a good)
and a belief (something thought to be true). The value of and
165. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 150 (outlining the theory of Samuel Pufendorf
that property is a "basis for the settlement and prevention of the conflicts which
arise naturally out of ... the problem of allocation").
166. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 285-87, 386-89; Rose, supra note 162, at 74;
see generally Epstein, supra note 161. For a critique of the use of the first occupancy
theory as a justification for the existence of any property rights, as opposed to a
justification for assigning particular property to an individual, see BECKER, supra
note 105, at 24-31; CARTER, supra note 125, at 78-86.
167. Rose, supra note 162, at 74-75.
168. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
169. Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distribu-
tive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 584-86 (1992).
170. Id. at 588.
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belief in individual autonomy provide a corner post for a synthe-
sized theory of obligation. The importance of autonomy in obliga-
tion theory should not be surprising given that individual auton-
omy is a bedrock principle in both classic liberal and capitalistic
theory.
The concept of autonomy is central to liberal theory. Liberal-
ism171 is a "political theory of limited government, providing
institutional guarantees for personal liberty."'72 A foundational
tenet of liberalism is a belief in individual freedom and autono-
my from the arbitrary and capricious imposition of authority
based upon the will of other persons and of the government.
17 3
Much of liberal theory is concerned with the protection of indi-
vidual rights in order to preserve individual freedom and
authority.' Most versions of liberalism connect individual
rights with the idea of a private sphere that others or the gov-
ernment cannot invade. 75 This belief in individual freedom and
autonomy is in turn based on a conception of each person having
equal moral worth and an ability to exercise reason to reach the
right result for that individual.'76
171. See JOHN H. HALLOWELL, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1950). Liberalism takes many forms and rationales. See, e.g., MARGARET MOORE,
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1993); 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 458-61
(Paul Edwards ed., 1972); BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LAW 69-70 (1994). The task here is not to justify liberalism in either its Kantian
or utilitarian form. See LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 2-5 (Michael J. Sandel ed.,
1984); MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, POLITICAL IDEAS AND IDEOLOGIES, 486-501 (1970). Rather,
the object of this thumbnail sketch of some of the underlying beliefs and values of
liberalism is to use it as a unifying framework for a theory of obligation.
172. LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 5 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (defin-
ing liberalism as a "political theory of limited government, providing institutional
guarantees for personal liberty").
173. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 87-88, 110-11.
174. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 88-89; see also MacNeil, Bureaucracy, supra
note 146, at 913. One of the themes in liberal debate is the role of rights in safe-
guarding individual freedom and autonomy. See generally IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLU-
TION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY (1986).
175. SHAPIRO, supra note 174, at 278; LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra
note 172, at 7. The authority of government is dependant upon a contractual rela-
tionship between the individual and the state, ultimately resting on the individual
decision to consent to be governed so that the government might protect the rights
of individuals. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 110, 113-14; EDWARD S. GREENBERG,
CAPITALISM AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAL 8-9 (1985). Various versions of the
social contract theory have been advanced. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and
Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70
IOWA L. REV. 769, 857-63 (1985).
176. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 90-91, 110-11. This belief in the ability of
individuals to reason is a foundational belief in legal theory. Neil Duxbury, Faith in
Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601,
602 (1993). This belief is closely related to the liberal conception of the rule of law.
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Autonomy is also a foundational value and belief in a capi-
talistic economic structure. At the core of capitalist theory is the
view that the individual is autonomous and self-interested. 177
Individuals in the pursuit of their own self interest are driven to
amass capital in order to gain power and control over others. 17
Autonomy is at the heart of the various justification theories
discussed above regardless of whether the justification focuses on
the societal or the individual good. The justification theories that
posit a social good flowing from enforcement of obligations pre-
sume that individuals act autonomously in their own self-inter-
est. When individuals act in their own self-interest, these theo-
rists presume that society as a whole benefits. Thus in contract
theory, promises create binding obligations because society is
presumed to be better off, either by creation of wealth or cooper-
ation, when individuals exercise their autonomy and make prom-
ises in promotion of their own self-interest. 179 In tort theory,
self-interested and autonomous persons will avoid accidents, and
achieve the optimal level of accident reduction for the benefit of
the entire society, when tort obligations are imposed whenever
the cost of accidents is more than the cost of safety."8 In prop-
erty theory, the self-interested and autonomous individual's
ownership of private property promotes the efficient use of re-
sources which in turn maximizes societal welfare or individual
liberty to the benefit of society as a whole.' 8 '
Individual autonomy is also central to the justification theo-
ries based on the promotion of individual good. For example, in
Fried and Barnett's contract theory, the individual can bind
herself as an exercise of her autonomy, which is deserving of
respect for its own sake.'82 Similarly, in tort theory, obligation
See id. at 624, 659-64; see also infra note 188.
177. Owen M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 908, 908
(1992); Rosenfeld, supra note 175, at 873 (describing Adam Smith's economic system);
ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF CAPITALISM 121 (1985); Marjorie
E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the
Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 124-26 (1994).
178. HEILBRONER, supra note 177, at 43-46.
179. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text; Jay M. Feinman, Critical Ap-
proaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 839 n.47 (1983).
180. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text; Weston, supra note 76, at
1001-06.
181. See supra notes 105-123 and accompanying text; Laura S. Underkuffler, On
Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 132-33 (1990); Carol M. Rose, Property
Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Ap-
proach, 57 TENN. L. REv. 577, 582 (1990).
182. See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text; Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay,
[Vol. 57
36
Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/2
1996] BANKRUPTCY & OBLIGATION THEORY 85
is imposed because one person, through exercise of autonomy,
damages another individual's autonomy." Property theorists
posit that private property is necessary to the moral develop-
ment of autonomous individuals, a desired state of affairs.' In
each of these justification theories, the idea of individual autono-
my is either explicitly or implicitly based on the idea of moral
equality of persons. That is, each person's individual autonomy is
morally equivalent to another person's individual autonomy.
In sum, all of the justification theories discussed above em-
body the concept of individual autonomy to act and to be free
from the actions of others as a core value. All of the theorists
recognize, however, that complete individual autonomy is an
undesirable goal. Thus, each theorist wrestles with the problem
of defining appropriate justifications for restraints on autonomy.
This struggle is not surprising given that both liberal and capi-
talist theory also grapple with balancing autonomy and restraint
on autonomy.
Although individual freedom and autonomy are bedrock
principles, liberal theory recognized the need for common author-
ity, or restraint on autonomy." The difficulty in liberal theory
has been how to accommodate the need for common authority
with the conception of freedom from authority.186 The proffered
answer to this issue was to focus on the authority of law as "im-
personal, objective, and independent of will... eternal, univer-
sal, immutable and rational."187 If law could meet these crite-
ria, then individuals would not be subjected to the arbitrary and
capricious will of other individuals, thus meeting the need for
common authority while respecting individual autonomy."
Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 565, 573; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.
L. REv. 340, 392 (1983) (stressing that for Fried, individual autonomy is touchstone
value).
183. See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
185. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 88.
186. Id. at 89.
187. Id. at 89-90.
188. See id. at 90; Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and
Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 999-1004 (1994). The concept of
the objective and determinate rule of law is oftentimes equated with the liberal idea
of pluralism, that is, the non-commitment to any dominant conception of the good.
William A. Edmundson, Transparency and Indeterminacy in the Liberal Critique of
Critical Legal Studies, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 557, 561 (1993). Hallowell, however,
connects the rule of law concept to the respect for individual autonomy free of the
arbitrary and capricious exercise of another's will. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 89-
90. Regardless of the justification for the concept of the objective rule of law, the
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Early liberals, however, did not use the positivist concept of law,
but rather a conception of law determined by individual reason
and conscience, usually influenced by natural law principles."9
critical legal studies critique of the concept is that law is neither determinate nor
objective. Edmundson, supra, at 562-63; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 549 (1993). Exactly
what is meant by liberalism's commitment to law as determinate and objective can
be debated. Id. at 558-59 (stating that liberalism requires a type of objectivity but
not determinacy). Coleman and Leiter argue that liberal conceptions of individual
autonomy and freedom from coercions require predictability and justification of legal
decisions but not determinate results. Id. at 593. They also argue that liberal rule of
law is committed to objectivity because of the need to mediate among conflicting
visions of the good. Id. at 595-96. They then attempt to define a type of objectivity
that will meet the liberal commitment and perhaps be accurately reflective of legal
practice. Id. at 620-34 (describing modest objectivity); see also Heide L. Feldman,
Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1994) (describing a concept of
"blend objectivity" to apply to legal judgments).
189. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 91, 111; see also John Finnis, Liberalism
and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV. 687 (1994). A pervasive critique of
liberalism is that it does not support a conception of the public good, but rather
supports a pluralistic approach in which the government must be neutral toward any
vision of the good life. W. J. STANKIEWICZ, IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
130-32 (1993); R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?,
27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 147, 164-65 (1993); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER-
ALISM 47-48 (1993) (explaining that the challenge of liberalism is to deal with plural-
ism); Leslie P. Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 65, 85 (discussing John Rawl's theory that moral values are an
essential element of the law).
The pluralistic approach to conceptions of the public good is rooted in the
beliefs of individual autonomy and moral equality. Government, ruling by consent of
the governed, cannot advance one moral viewpoint over another and thus must be
neutral toward all moral viewpoints. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES:
GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 80-81 (1991); William Powers,
Jr., Constructing Liberal Political Theory, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 443, 451-52 (1993) (re-
viewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)); LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL
LIFE, supra note 172, at 6; Benjamin R. Barber, Liberal Democracy and the Costs of
Consent, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 54, 57-62 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
1989); see also John J. Gilligan, A Search for Community: The Problem of Governance
in a Democratic Society, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 101, 107-11 (1993) (radical individualism
does not provide an obligation for community wide discussion of fundamental ques-
tions). The perspective that values are incommensurable adds to the argument that a
liberal conception of government must be pluralistic. GALSTON, supra, at 140-41;
Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1355-56 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 780-81 (1994). The liberal belief in human
reason capable of being used to make persuasive arguments about the good also
gives support to the government as neutral toward moral viewpoints. See Francis,
supra, at 74-78; Rainey, supra, at 159-63.
Some theorists have advanced arguments that liberalism is not necessarily
committed to a pluralistic conception of the good. Stephen Holmes, The Permanent
Structure of Antiliberal Thought, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 227, 239-40
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) ("Liberals wholeheartedly endorsed the common good
of collective welfare. They distrusted the idea of common good to the extent that 'the
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Capitalism also recognizes the need to restrain autonomy in
order to produce wealth. This restraint on autonomy appears in
the reliance on the institution of private property which re-
strains another's autonomy to act with respect to the owner's
property. The concept of private property operates to place power
over resources in the hands of individuals so that those individu-
als can use those resources to amass capital.19 °
Obligation theorists also propose various mediating concepts
to attempt a reconciliation between autonomy and restraint on
autonomy. Contract theory uses the concept of exchange to justi-
fy enforcing restraint on individual autonomy. For example, a
promise will be enforced if there is evidence of a bargain or ex-
change given for the restraint on the promisor's autonomy. Evi-
dence of such an exchange may come in different forms, such as
consideration, consent, or even reliance by the other party. This
evidence of exchange serves as a screening device for determin-
ing whether someone has agreed to restrain her own autono-
good' was identified with certain dangerous and oppressive values."); MOORE, supra
note 171, at 177-78 (noting that liberalism is committed to a conception of the good
that values individual autonomy above all else); GALSTON, supra, at 165; Gardbaum,
supra. Galston sketches one concept of the individual good that he contends is con-
sistent with liberalism. GAISTON, supra, at 173-77 (valuing life, normal human devel-
opment of basic capacities, satisfaction of human interests and purposes, freedom, ra-
tionality, human relationships, and subjective satisfaction). Gaston argues that these
elements of human good are not all or nothing propositions but are ideas that are
subject to give and take and a situational context. Id. at 166-73. A theory of the
good as Galston posits, however, is not to be used to justify public coercion to make
individuals embrace that vision. The liberal society should strive to make available
opportunities for its citizens to achieve their individual good. Id. at 178-79.
Moore argues that for liberal societies to survive, they must teach liberal val-
ues of individual autonomy, tolerance, and equal respect for persons. Thus liberal
societies are committed to that version of the good. MOORE, supra note 171, at 170-
71. Moore advocates a view of liberalism that posits that individual autonomy is both
an individual good and a community good. Her view of the interrelationship between
community good and individual good leads to the conclusion that individual autonomy
does not always trump other values which may conflict with that autonomy. Id. at
186-88.
John Rawls relies on a consensus theory of fundamental values to justify exer-
cise of political power. The particular conception of the political good advanced in the
liberal state is whatever fundamental values fall within that consensus. RAWLS, su-
pra, at 139-40. Rawls separates out a political conception of the good from moral,
religious or other conceptions of the good. Id. at 175. The bulk of Rawls' book is
devoted to working out the political conception of the good. For critiques of Rawls'
work, see Symposium on John Rawls' Political Liberalism, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 549
(1994); Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503 (1994);
Donald R. Korobkin, Political Justification and the Law, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1898
(1994); Frank I. Michelman, The Subject of Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1994);
Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (1994).
190. HEILBRONER, supra note 177, at 38-39; GREENBERG, supra note 175, at 39.
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my. 19 1
The tort theorists also use various concepts to mediate the
primacy of individual autonomy with restraints on that autono-
my. The law and economic theorists employ the concept of an
optimal level of harm avoidance to justify imposing liability and
thus restraining autonomy. Such a restraint is justified either
when someone fails to correctly balance the costs of safety with
the costs of harm for a given act or when the action causes harm
regardless of the level of care taken.'92 The theorists who argue
that tort liability is justified by corrective justice principles re-
strain individual autonomy by using the idea of fault. Fault is
based upon the objectification of the moral imperative to do no
harm to another or upon the moral equality of persons which
requires one person to avoid imposing an unreasonable risk of
harm on another.'93 These theories rely on the idea that one
individual should not impose an unreasonable risk of harm on
another as the central tort concept that mediates between indi-
vidual autonomy to be free to act and the need for restraints on
that autonomy.'
Property theorists impose restraints on unfettered individual
autonomy in two different arenas: resource allocation and re-
source use. Resource allocation theories prescribe a criterium for
such allocation to resolve competition for unassigned resources,
such as labor, consent, or first occupancy. These assignment
theories restrain individual autonomy through designating the
criterium that other individuals must respect in resource alloca-
tion. "'95
Property theorists discuss principles that might restrain an
individual's exercise of power over resources assigned to that
individual. Most of the theorists advocate almost absolute indi-
vidual power over the resource use, allowing for restraints on
that power only when the cost of enforcing exclusive rights is
more than the benefit of those rights.' 96 On the basis that pri-
191. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
194. See Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness,
Participation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 502-04 (1993).
For a critique that current tort doctrine is not a justified restraint on autonomy, see
Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY
L.J. 1 (1993).
195. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text. In property theory generally,
conceptions of restraint on individual autonomy over resource use seem less accept-
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vate property is integral to the development of individual autono-
my, Radin argues that restraints on individual power over re-
source use can be justified if that restraint is not harmful to the
individual's development.197
All of the above theories of obligation thus accept some re-
straint on individual autonomy. Such restraints are linked to the
idea of responsibility to and respect for the individual autonomy
of others. Classic liberal principles recognize the role of responsi-
bility to the community'98 and that responsibility for the conse-
quences of the exercise of autonomy is integral to a liberal soci-
ety as part of the respect of others' rights and individualism.'99
Even though liberal theory has been critiqued as equating indi-
vidual autonomy or liberty with license and freedom from re-
sponsibility,2 0 liberal theory does require at least the responsi-
bility to respect others' autonomy.201
This idea of responsibility to respect autonomy and re-
straints on autonomy is implicit in the idea of creating an obliga-
tion in general and in imposing obligations in particular situa-
tions. The individual to whom the obligation is assigned is re-
sponsible for making sure that the obligation is fulfilled.2 2 The
contract theorists assume that when someone is obligated to
fulfill the promise because the evidence of exchange exists, the
promisor has the responsibility to follow through on that prom-
ise. Thus, a failure to fulfill that obligation is rarely excused.2 3
able than restraints on autonomy in other areas of legal theory. This primacy of
individual autonomy in property, with much less allowance for justified restraint, can
be linked to private property as a foundational linchpin for capitalistic production of
wealth. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. The less restrictions on one's use
of private property, the more freedom one has to use that property to produce capi-
tal.
197. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
198. Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DuKE L.J. 989, 1025-26
(1994); see also HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 88.
199. GALSTON, supra note 189, at 221-27. The concept of responsibility for the
outcome of one's actions presumes some level of freedom to act, or free will. J.R.
LucAs, RESPONSIBILITY 11-31 (1993); EDGAR BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSI-
BILITY 14-29 (1980). A value of individual autonomy requires a belief in free will.
200. A major critique of liberal theory is the supposed separation of the exercise
of rights from the idea of responsibility for one's actions. STANKIEWICZ, supra note
189, at 122-24. This critique alleges that the right be free has come to mean free-
dom from responsibility to the community and others. Id.; McClain, supra note 198,
at 1002-1005 (critique equates liberty with license).
201. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.
203. Hillman, supra note 10, at 122. Part of the difficulty in the contract excuse
cases is determining when the adversity encountered in fulfilling the contractual
obligation would be too much and thus lead the court to excuse the promisor's per-
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The property theorists also assume that other people have the
responsibility to respect the owner's use of a resource assigned to
the owner.2 Reasons for ignoring that responsibility are rarely
accepted.2 °5 The tort theorists explicitly discuss whether respon-
sibility for fulfilling the obligation must be on the person who is
said to be responsible or whether that obligation can be satisfied
by other administrative or loss spreading devices.20 6
Autonomy, restraint on autonomy and responsibility provide
unifying principles that support the concept of enforcing obliga-
tions in general and in specific fact situations. Persons are bound
to obligations as part of the respect for their own and others'
autonomy using a reciprocal concept of responsibility.
B. Human Rationality and the Capacity for Human Progress
The obligation theories are also linked by a belief in human
rationality and a belief in the capacity for human progress. By
human rationality, I mean the capacity of humans to engage in
the process of justification and reasoning to reach a conclusion.
By capacity for human progress, I mean the ability of humans to
improve their circumstances or the world around them. Both
human rationality and the capacity for human progress are be-
liefs that provide justification for enforcing obligations.
Liberalism and capitalism share an implied belief in human
rationality which supports the value of and belief in individual
autonomy. According to liberal theory, individual exercise of
autonomy is based upon the respect for reason. The neutral rule
of law as a legitimate mediating concept between autonomy and
acceptable restraints on autonomy depends upon the ability of
formance. Id. at 120-29. The law and economics argument that a person should be
excused from performance of a contractual obligation depends upon how the parties
have allocated the risk of a particular interference with performance. Richard A.
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88-89 (1977). Contractual obliga-
tion should be excused where the promisee is the superior risk bearer of the precise
risk to performance that occurred. The promisee is the superior risk bearer where
either he is in a better position to prevent the risk from materializing or where the
promisee is the superior (i.e., least costly) insurer against the risk. Id. at 90-92. But
see Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 311, 322-23 (1982) (adding that promisor should not be discharged if
promisor has taken inadequate precautions to ensure performance or mitigate harm,
promisee has mitigated, and promisee's costs of insurance are greater than
promisor's).
204. See supra notes 127-34, 161-70 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 57
42
Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/2
1996] BANKRUPTCY & OBLIGATION THEORY 91
people to apply, in a reasoned way, principles of law to particular
fact situations."7 Capitalism embodies the idea of the self-in-
terested and reasoning individual engaged in activity to amass
capital in order to produce goods and services and to gain power
over others.2"8
Each of the various legal obligation theories also posit a
rational person acting according to some rational calculus." 9
Although the calculus is different in each of the respective theo-
ries, the rational person construct is pervasive. The obligation
theories based on utilitarian or law and economics justifications
assume a rational, reasoning actor who makes decisions to enter
an exchange and allocate risk in contract law,210 weighs the
costs and benefits of action in tort law,2" and puts resources to
their highest and best use in property law.21 2 The theories that
rely on the social good of liberty depend upon a rational actor
making decisions about resource use to foster personal free-
dom.213 The theories based upon obligation as a necessary as-
pect of an individual's moral rights or ethical development posit
a rational actor who makes promises to advance her own interest
or engages in conduct which manifests an intent to be bound to a
promise.214 Similarly, in tort theory, the rational actor is in
control of her actions and appreciates the degree of risk of her
activities sufficiently enough to judge her at fault when she caus-
es harm.215 The rational actor, in property theory, uses private
property to learn about herself and her place in the world.2 6
Human rationality is closely connected to the belief in the
capacity for human progress. Liberal theory's faith in reason
leads to the idea of the inevitable positive progression of human
thought and capabilities.2 7 Capitalism, as well, posits using
reason and autonomy to generate and amass capital (the surplus
207. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
209. See CARTER, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that a rational justification is the
heart of legal reasoning).
210. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995)
(positing that contract doctrines tacitly recognize the limits of rationality and cogni-
tion).
215. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
217. HALLOWELL, supra note 171, at 131-32.
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of production over what is needed to produce) which is then used
to generate more production in a never ending cycle of expan-
sion.218
The obligation theories are also linked to the idea of the
progressive nature of human capabilities. The law and economics
theorists posit that the creation and enforcement of obligation in
contracts, torts, and property, fosters the preservation and ex-
pansion of wealth,219 an idea very similar to the liberal and cap-
italistic ideas of continuous expansion and progression of human
capabilities. The liberty based arguments for private property
accept the idea that such property creates or allows individual
freedom to act.22° Implicit in this idea is the concept that such
individual liberty supports the progress of human capabilities in
society.22' In contract theory, individual development theorists
view the enforcement of contracts as essential to an individual's
best use of her capabilities.2 The corrective justice based tort
theorists implicitly rely on the progressive ability of human
thought when the standard of care is objective rather than sub-
jective.22 The objective standard requires a belief in the ability
of human thought to progress beyond the subjective capabilities
of the actors involved. The individual development theorists in
property view obligation as essential to foster the progression of
an individual's development.2"
C. Summary of Obligation Synthesis
Based on the above described similarities between obligation
theories, liberalism and capitalism, several core ideas can be
identified. First, individual autonomy is highly valued. Autono-
my means the ability to be free to act or to not act. Second, re-
straints on individual autonomy are recognized when needed to
advance autonomy as a value. The value of moral equality of
persons requires that an individual's autonomy be restrained at
least in those circumstances where an exercise of autonomy
would unduly impinge on another person's exercise of that
other's autonomy. Part of this mediation between individual au-
218. HEILBRONER, supra note 177, at 33-36; GREENBERG, supra note 175, at 146-
47 (describing expansionist need and business cycles of boom and depression).
219. See supra notes 51, 81, 110 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 61, 66-69 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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tonomy and restraint on autonomy is the relationship between
autonomy and responsibility. Autonomous action requires one to
bear the responsibility for the consequences of the exercise of
that autonomy. Third, each theory has a core belief in the ulti-
mate rationality of human actors. Finally, each theory in some
way advances the idea that human capabilities are progressive
and expansive.
V. GOOD FAITH FILING AND OBLIGATION
The purpose of this article is to provide an explanation for
why courts have felt compelled to erect a barrier to bankruptcy
relief that Congress did not explicitly place into the statute. The
above synthesis of a theory of obligation provides one way of
explaining the courts' compulsion to restrict access to bankrupt-
cy.
The above discussion demonstrates that in a non-bankruptcy
forum, imposing obligation is seen as a legitimate restraint on
the exercise of individual autonomy. In a debtor and creditor
relationship, the debtor's autonomy is restricted by either con-
tractual obligations or tort obligations justified according to those
theories. The creditor's autonomy to act against the debtor's
property to satisfy the debtor's contract or tort obligation to the
creditor is justifiably restricted based on the justifications for
private property and based on the attendant restrictions on in-
terference with the debtor's ownership rights. When the debtor
fails to satisfy the contract or tort obligation to the creditor, the
creditor is given some license to avoid its obligation to respect
the debtor's property rights, such as by seizing and selling the
debtor's property to pay the contract or tort obligation.2"
These reciprocal contract, tort, and property obligations are
in turn built upon the premises of human rationality and capaci-
ty for progress. Humans are believed to be rational and to incur
obligations in a rational manner, including not incurring more
obligations than one is able to pay according to one's responsibil-
ity for fulfilling the obligations so incurred. Hand in glove with
this rationality is also the belief in the capacity of humans to
progress, including creation of enough value to pay obligations
incurred. As long as the rationality and progressive capacity
225. Typically state law provides some method for seizing and selling property to
pay debts. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 550.011-.37 (West 1995) (execution and sale
process to satisfy judgments); U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504 (1994) (seize and sell personal
property collateral to pay secured debt).
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premises are true, obligations are fully satisfied.
In the bankruptcy context, the pre-existing restraints on the
debtor's autonomy in contract and tort obligations are recognized
as existing and legitimate. Both liquidation methodology and
reorganization methodology operate on the principle that the
obligations should be satisfied out of the debtor's property. In
liquidation, the concept is to satisfy the debtor's obligation out of
existing property. In reorganization, the concept is to satisfy the
debtor's pre-filing obligations out of a mixture of the debtor's
existing and future property.
In the bankruptcy context, however, the belief in the pro-
gressive capability of humans is at the forefront. In all of the
chapters, the usual rule is that the liquidation procedure or the
reorganization plan provides a method of paying pre-filing obli-
gations. Once the creditor has received her entitlement under
the liquidation process or reorganization plan, the creditor is
prohibited from taking further action to enforce the pre-filing in
personam obligation.226 The provisions for discharging those
obligations are premised on the idea that a debtor who has
turned over her property to the creditors deserves a chance to
start over."7 A debtor who starts over free of the burden of pre-
filing debt has the ability to improve her own circumstances and
become a contributing member of society.22 This is an explicit
belief in the human ability to progress.
What is different in the bankruptcy context is what counts
as rational behavior. Although the non-bankruptcy context posits
rationality as fulfilling one's responsibility to meet one's obliga-
tions, the bankruptcy statute appears to allow on its face, a
different rationality premise. That different premise is the idea
that it is acceptable rational behavior to not meet one's obliga-
tions. Steeped in the non-bankruptcy paradigm of fulfilling obli-
gations, the judges look for ways to justify what seems to be an
irrational premise. The usual proffered justification for either liq-
uidation or reorganization is the Congressionally mandated fresh
226. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 (prevention of post discharge attempts to collect personal
debt obligation), 727 (chapter 7 discharge), 1141 (chapter 11 discharge), 1228 (chapter
12 discharge), 1328 (chapter 13 discharge) (1994).
227. See Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991).
228. See Douglas G. Boshkoff, Fresh Start, False Start, or Head Start?, 70 IND.
L.J. 549 (1995); Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification
for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515
(1991); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1047 (1987).
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start for or rehabilitation of debtors.229 That justification, how-
ever, seems to make sense only if the debtor is somehow worthy
of that second chance at achieving rationality according to the
non-bankruptcy rationality premise, that is incurring obligations
that one can pay or satisfy out of one's property. Hence, the
judges look for ways to limit the access to the fresh start or reha-
bilitation procedure to those debtors who are worthy of the sec-
ond chance.
The search for that worthy debtor is at the heart of the good
faith inquiry. In determining good faith, courts look at the
debtor's pre-petition conduct, the debtor's motivation for filing,
the debtor's overall financial situation, and the effect of the filing
on the creditors. Examples of pre-petition conduct that might
lead to a finding of bad faith filing includes previous bankruptcy
filings, misrepresented or concealed assets, and illegal or immor-
al conduct.23 The debtor's motivation for filing is also impor-
tant. If the debtor filed to frustrate one creditor, obtain an unfair
advantage over one creditor, or to accomplish an ulterior purpose
other than pay debts, the court might find a bad faith filing.23'
The courts also scrutinize the debtor's overall financial situation
to see if the debtor is in financial distress, has a lavish lifestyle
or excessive income, or is generally in need of the obligation
altering bankruptcy procedure.232 Finally, the courts examine
the effect of the filing on the creditors. While using bankruptcy
to resolve multiple debts with multiple creditors is acceptable
behavior, using bankruptcy to primarily affect one major creditor
is viewed as an illegitimate use of the process.2" Viewing good
faith filing in the context of the values and beliefs that support
229. Industrial Ins. Servs. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1128 (6th Cir.
1991); Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek
Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986).
230. The Honorable Leif M. Clark & Sharron B. Lane, Having Faith in Good
Faith Analysis, 683 PLI/CoMM 669 (1994); Ordin, supra note 5, at 1798-1801.
231. Ordin, supra note 5, at 1801-12; Flaccus, supra note 4, at 407-08; Ponoroff
& Knippenberg, supra note 5, at 933-38. Ponoroff and Knippenberg also discuss filing
for the purpose of obtaining a litigation advantage that could not be obtained outside
of bankruptcy. Id. at 938-42. Flaccus also identifies a group of cases she calls serial
filings, where the debtor files successive chapter 11 petitions or files successive peti-
tions under different chapters. Flaccus, supra note 4, at 407. These types of cases
can also be thought of as strategic filings as the debtor is filing petitions in series in
order to restructure debt in a particular manner as allowed under the bankruptcy
statute.
232. Clark & Lane, supra note 230, at 669.
233. This is the so-called single asset case situation. See Clark & Lane, supra
note 230, at 669; Flaccus, supra note 4, at 405-06; Ordin, supra note 5, at 1813-25;
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 5, at 927-32.
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enforcement of obligations and identifying a reason why the
courts feel compelled to search for that worthy debtor provides a
jumping off point for further questions.
One question is whether courts should be engaged in at-
tempting to determine the worthiness of the debtor to use a
procedure that Congress has enacted without an explicit screen
for such worthiness. That is a difficult issue involving ideals
about the proper division of power between Congress and the
courts2"4 and about the proper relationship between state and
federal governments given that most obligations are created and
enforced in a non-bankruptcy context according to state law and
by state courts.
Another question this raises is who should decide worthi-
ness, even if such worthiness is a proper question for courts in
general. Should bankruptcy judges decide that question as a
matter of fact, or should the appellate judges decide that ques-
tion as a matter of law? Won't it make a big difference what per-
sonal background the judges have, if the judge is attempting to
decide whether or not the debtor in front of the court is worthy
of the process? For example, how does a judge know whether or
not a debtor is engaging in a "lavish" lifestyle?
Third, should worthiness be an inquiry at all? What would
happen if bankruptcy was an open process with no screening for
worthiness? Would the entire structure of interwoven obligations
in the non-bankruptcy world collapse if these types of cases were
not kept out of the process? Would our values and beliefs in
autonomy, restraint on autonomy, rationality and progress be so
undermined that our economic structure and our everyday lives
would change for the worse?
If worthiness is a proper inquiry, how should worthiness be
decided? Should this be an ad hoc, "I know it when I see it" type
of inquiry? Can it be structured to make it more predictable
without being too overbroad or too underinclusive?235
Finally, the good faith inquiry and the search for the worthy
debtor who can use the bankruptcy process raise questions about
what having a second chance really means.236 Why do we value
234. Bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts but are structured as adjuncts
to Article III courts. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
235. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing rules versus standards in law).
236. The purpose of Chapter 11 specifically is a hotly debated topic. See Rusch,
supra note 10, at 167-80. That article collects the literature up to 1993. Since that
time, the following articles have continued the debate about the purpose of Chapter
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the idea and practice of a second chance?237 What purposes
does having a second chance serve? Can the concept of the sec-
ond chance be structured in such a way as to be compatible with
the idea of enforcing obligation?
Requiring good faith filing raises fundamental questions
about our values and beliefs about obligations. Understanding
that context should help us focus on what is at stake in this
issue. Thinking about the above list of questions is the next step
in undertaking a thoughtful analysis of bankruptcy availability.
11. The Washington University Interdisciplinary Conference on Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Theory, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 797-1406 (1994); Barry E. Alder, Finance's Theoreti-
cal Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1994);
John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53 (1995); Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy Reorganization and Eco-
nomic Development, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 499 (1994-95); Richard V. Butler & Scott M.
Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 269 (1994); Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter
11, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 633 (1993); Mary J. Newborn, The New Rawlsian Theory of
Bankruptcy Ethics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 111 (1994); Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the
Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 441 (1994-95); Robert K Rasmussen &
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1995); Robert K Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bank-
ruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets,
Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 465;
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV.
336 (1993).
237. Some historically based analyses have looked at the inevitable boom and
bust cycles present in a capitalistic economy as part of the justification for the need
for a second chance procedure. See generally Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy
in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160 (1991); Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law
and the Maturing of American Capitalism, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1994); CHARLES
WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
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